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A Contract Systems Approach to Human Systems Actualization
(June, 1974)
Jay T. Tooley, M.S., Fort Hays Kansas State College
Directed by: Dr. Russell Kraus
This dissertation provides a theoretical and philosophical
rationale for a contractual model of human behavior and social
organization. The specific theoretical, axiological and epistemo-
logical assumptions of the model are articulated. As a part of
the theoretical exposition, original theories of axiological
specification and human actual ization are presented.
The second part of the dissertation is devoted to the
application of the contract model. In this section a major
organizational case study is presented as an illustrative
application of the contract model to the transformation of a 120
year old custodial mental hospital. The final chapter of the
dissertation is concerned with future applications such as
contractually negotiated ethics, alternate marital contracts,
and human systems design.
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INTRODUCTION
The appearance of a recent edited book. Conscience
, Contract
and Social Reality (Johnson, Dokecki & Mowrer, 1972), has
signaled that the contract model of human behavior and social
organization has come into its own as a legitimate frame of
reference for the social and behavioral sciences. Its pragmatic
utility as a model for viewing social reality and as a methodology
for changing reality can be appreciated when one looks at the
diverse applications that include: clinical treatment as in
contract contingency management (Bandura, 1969; Kanfer &
Phillips, 1970; Tooley, 1966; Tooley & Pratt, 1966); self
control (Kanfer & Phillips, 1972; Tooley & Pratt, 1966);
marriage and family contracts (O'Neill & O'Neill, 1973;
Satir, 1970); in education applied to performance contracting
(ETS, 1970); and classroom management (Homme, 1969); learning
contracts (Carew & Tooley, 1973; Seeman, 1973; Tooley, 1972);
and ultimately in the broader domain of human systems design
and development (Chickering, 1971; Gioia, 1973; Goodson &
Turner, 1972; Pratt & Tooley, 1964, 1966, 1970; Southworth,
1974; Tooley, 1971; Zuelzer & Tooley, 1974).
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This burgeoning concern and application of the psychology
of contracts has occurred without a comprehensive and explicit
statement of the basic theoretical, pholosophical and epistemological
assumptions underlying the model, although this author and
Steve Pratt began the original formulations of contract psychology
over ten years ago when the concept was basically foreign to
the social and behavioral sciences.
It is the purpose of this dissertation to explicate the
implicit and explicit theoretical and philosophical assumptions
which collectively guide the behavior of those who employ
a contractual approach to social problems and the analysis
of social reality. In addition to this historical-theoretical
treatment, an organizational case study describing its application
to the transformation of a medically-oriented, custodial state
hospital into an educationally-oriented Center for Human
Actualization is used to illustrate the utility of the contract-
systems model as an organizing principle.
The dissertation is organized into two basic parts: The first
seven chapters which provide the theoretical and philosophical
rationale of contract systems theory; and the final three chapters
which are concerned with the application of the theory.
CHAPTER I
THE CONTRACT AS THE BASIC CONSTRUCT
All models of human behavior and social organization implicitly
or explicitly include a model of man--basic assumptions and value
judgments regarding the nature of man, the nature of social reality
and the relationship between man and his social reality (Tooley,
1974).
Gaining wider recognition is the realization that
conceptualization of an appropriate heuristic model of
modern man is not a superfluous theoretical embellishment
but rather is an essential precondition to progress, in
social psychiatry and social psychology generally, as
well as to progress in theory and practice concerning
psychosocial disorders. In these social-behavioral
sciences every concept and every operation employed,
either explicitly or implicitly, posits a model of
man which in turn decisively conditions theory and
practice. To avoid blind trial-and-error empiricism
and distorting reductionism, a philosophically and
theoretically based frame-of-reference is called for—
for trying-out and evaluating a wide variety of
derivative models of intervention . The model of
man selected, structures not only the conceptualization
of psychological disorders but also both corrective
facilities and corrective procedures (Pratt & Tooley,
1964, p. 52).
In this chapter the intention is to articulate those assumptions
which collectively constitute a contractual model of man and social
reality, which has been evolving for centuries (Maine, 1861),
but has only begun in the last ten years to achieve its scientific
expression (Pratt & Tooley, 1964; Tooley & Pratt, 1963). In reviewing
these developments over the past ten years in a significant edited
work. Conscience , Contract and Social Reality , Hobart Mowrer and
2his colleagues have commented:
Steve Pratt and Jay Tooley (1964, 1966) were the first writers 1
in recent years to stress this distinction (contractual vs
intrapsychic models).... ihus a whole new rationale for
psychopathology of a functional nature is emerging which
stresses interpersonal rather than intrapsychic events (both
as regards causation and correction); and here contract
psychology seems to be replacing the former emphasis upon
conscience, guilt, and so on.... In any case, there seems
to be a declining interest, both theoretically and
practically, in the concept of conscience and a lively
and growing concern with the psychology of contracts
(Johnson, Dokecki & Mowrer, 1972; Pp. 415-416).
Increasing numbers of social and behavioral scientists are beginning
to express their convictions that an empirical model of man based
upon contractual assumptions leads to more fruitful (valid, useful)
outcomes than earlier, religious models that frequently impinged
upon scientific inquiry (Boring, 1929; Kihn, 1962; Tooley, 1969).
This emerging heuristic model for modern man encompasses and brings
into sharp focus the distinguishing contractual essence of man.
Contract is at once an ancient phenomenon and a relatively
modern one All this is to be expected. For to make and
break promises is an exquisitely human faculty. Nietzsche,
who so strongly influenced Freud, even suggested "to
breed an animal that is able to make promises... is the task
which Nature set for herself." The result is man. So
far as we know, no other animal has this capability (Szasz,
1965, p. 108).
My first proposition is one which I believe all will accept.
It is that as soon as man learned to talk, became able to
think about the future and acquired a moral sense, he had all
of the equipment essential for making and keeping promises.
Each of these faculties, you will perceive, is rather close
"•For an intriguing history of the earlier uses of legal, social,
and behavioral contracts see Maine's (1861) classic text. Ancient Law.
to the core of what makes humanity human... (Haviqhurst,
1961, p. 12). 2
3
Thus, man as soci us is cast in irreducible form on the stage of
life. From the perspective of contract systems theory, the dis-
tinguishing essence of human beings and of the human enterprise,
of individuals and societies, is the capacity for the development,
expression, and exchange of human values.
The fundamental postulate of this system asserts that the essence
of man consists of
,
and is expressed by
,
his unique capacity to form
contractual relationships ; this applies to man-in-the-universe,
whether taken individually, intrapsychical ly, interpersonally, in
primary or socio-political groupings, internationally, or in outer-
space.
2Ten years later, Havighurst (1970) operationalized his
philosophical expression in conceptualizing the plight of culturally
disadvantaged children in the public school system.
It may be useful to examine the educational problem of the
socially disadvantaged in terms of the implicit contract
that a family and a school accept when a child is entrusted
by his family to a school. The parents contract to prepare
their child for school entrance, both cognitively and
affectively. They further contract to keep him in school
and to make home conditions appropriate for his success in
school. The school contracts to receive the child, teach
him as well as it can, taking account of his strengths
and weaknesses and the ways in which he can learn most
effectively.
Very little of this contract is put into legal codes,
but the education of the child is successful only when
both parties carry out their obligations fully. Sometimes
one or both parties fail to understand the nature of
these obligations.
4Our contract systems-expl ici t or implicit, conscious or unconscious,
unilateral or consensual, voluntary or coercive--consti tute warp and
woof of personal and social life. The integrative function for all
human relationships at all levels of social organization can be
conceptualized as contractual: contracts are the social bindings that
hold each human, and the human-made world together. We make contracts
with ourselves and others, while others make contracts that affect
every aspect of our lives.
At the same time, we are both the creatures and creators of our
contractual world. "From birth to death every human being is a Party"
(i.e. as a party to the Societal Contract and within the contract spheres
of living) "so that neither he nor anything done or suffered can
possibly be understood when it is separated from the fact of participa-
tion in an extensive body of transactions--to which a given human being
may contribute and which he modifies, but only by virtue of being a
partaker in them (Dewey, 1948, p. 198)." We are our contract systems
operationally defined by the number, types and patterns of our contracts.
The career of humans, the career of societies, through the ages and
today, can best be apprehended in terms of the nature and dialectics
of the Societal Contracts characterizing each transitional society. 4
3As Churchill once said: "Men shape buildings, but buildings shape men.
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I use the concept of the
" Societal Contract " to label the political-
economic socio-cul tural configuration of any nation, country or society,
present or past. My use of the term obviously does not commit us to
any of the particular theories of "Social Contract" adduced in the past
whether theories about the ostensible "original" Social Contract, or
about the "ideal" Social Contract, as proposed by Locke, Hobbes, Hume,
or Rousseau. Critical analyses of all of these theories of "Social
Contract" are of course readily available (Mills, 1960).
5In summarizing the significance of the concept of contract throughout
the history of man the economist, von Mises (1949), concludes that,
"Human civilization as it has been known to historical experience
is preponderantly a product of contractual relations (p. 198)."
For Hayakawa (1967), the general semanticist, contractual agreements
comprise the sine qua non of society, "What we call society is a
vast network of mutual agreements Without such agreements there
would be no such thing as society (p. 213)."
The Societal Contract that defines each society can be represented
by the contract spheres of human endeavor. These contract spheres
have been approached by those arbitrary conveniences called the
social sciences and can be selectively seen as the political sphere,
economic sphere, etc.; or as contract spheres studied by political
science, sociology, economics, psychology, law, education, etc.
(Koch, 1963; Lynd, 1939; Mills, 1959).
From the contractual perspective, man is in_ society and society in_
man (Frank, 1951; Popper, 1945). The concept of psychosocial contract
systems makes it possible to fill in the long-lost "missing link"
between the personality level (intrapsychic or personal istic) and
the social (or societal) level. The career of each man in his own
time, through the social stages and crises of his unique life
(Allport, 1962; Allport, 1955; Erikson, 1959; Parad, 1965), can
best be appreciated in terms of the interpersonal, ideological.
6and situational contracts to which he commits himself and to which
he is committed. Kinds of contracts are as diversified as the ever-
changing, emerging, kinds of contract spheres, major and minor, that
constitute the total human enterprise. Consider the range of
reciprocal role and status defining contracts such as the marital
contract, the parent-child contract, the employer-employee contract,
the teacher-student contract, the citizen-politician contract, ad
infinitum . All social relationships represent contractual transactions
in the major contract spheres of 1 i vi ng--pol i ti cal
,
economic,
professional or vocational, avocational, primary or secondary group,
marital, parental, or whatever.
I use the concept of contract here not only in its legal, but
in a broad social sense, in the etymologically most generic, denotative
and connotative usage (Mandler & Kesson, 1959; Nash, 1964). Contracts
represent reciprocal arrangements, agreements, promises, understandings,
expectancies, commitments, compacts, covenants; they are ends -means
instrumentalities for the exchange of human values and materials as
well as the achievement of goals and objectives. They can, of course,
be either creative and actualizing, or constraining and counteractual izing.
Contracts occur among parties- -as between a person and a group,
organization, or country; between groups, organizations or social
systems of any size; or conversely between any such social system
and its own subsystems (e.g. between an organization and its
7constituent departments, and within departments), between any system
or subsystem and individual members. Furthermore, and this is
particularly significant, human systems have the unique capacity
for contractual transactions with themselves--for reflexive (system-
with-itself) contracts. This capacity for reflexive contracts
obtains at all lovels-of-organization for human systems, from
individual (intrapsychic) self-system to international systems--from
a reflexive New Year's resolution to the United Nations' "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights." Philosophically and psychologically,
all contracts between parties are actually secondary to each party's
primary reflexive contract (i.e. subjective decision) to enter into
the inter-party contract.
For human systems, the language of contract systems theory is
contractual requiring that meaning be derived from the nature of the
contractual transaction itself--but the transaction invariably
considered within the context of the total relevant contractual -
field . Again, this applies for human social systems at all levels,
intrapsychic to international. Language, itself, in the generic
sense, is based on contract, on the reciprocal agreement to accept
specified conventions (meanings) --signs , signals, word symbols,
and syntax. Communication (and communication theory) invariably
involving language (however abstracted or analyzed), and exchange
is also conceptualized as a domain (an aspect) of contract theory
(Homans, 1961).
8For the two inextricable purposes of understanding the human
enterprise and actualizing human systems, we have conceptualized the
concept of contract as the regnant construct
.
5 As the^ highest-order
theoretical construct, contract covers such basic concepts as
contract-systems
, organizational contracts, contractual transactions,
and thus incorporates as key subsidiary or derivative constructs:
transaction
,
exchange
, organization , 1 evel s -of- organ i zation
, refl exi vi ty ,
and commitment
. Also incorporated are concepts that designate
specific contract-system arrangements: institution
,
role
,
and status ;
and of course all contractual or related terminology: contract
"conditions," "terms," "negotiations," "bargaining," "obligations,"
"rights," "benefits," "penalties," "cooperation," "competition,"
"power," "conflict," "costs," etc.
The most significant advance in the social -behavioral sciences
today is perhaps the movement toward systematic integration of the
social-behavioral sciences (as against fractionation, reductionism,
mechanization and dehumanization). Particularly relevant is the
integrative work of the exchange and role theorists, Adams (1965);
^In: The Psychology of Personal Constructs , Kelly (1955) details
the theoretical-methodological requirements and functions of the
"Fundamental Postulate." "A good psychological theory should be
expressed in terms of abstractions which can be traced through
most of the phenomena with which psychology must deal (p. 44)."
It is precisely the fundamental postulate and the regnant construct
that must be expressed at this level of abstraction so that, with
their corollary constructions, they can track down the entire range
of psychosocial problems and happenings.
9Biddle and Thomas (1966); Blau (1964); Homans (1961); Kuhn (1963);
Levine and White (1961 ); 6 the transactional psychologists (previously
cited) and the "interactional" theorists in sociology and social
psychology e.g. Sells (1963); Sherif (1967); Brown (1942); Cooley
(1902); Faris and Dunham (1939); Kantor (1959); and Mead (1934).
The Language of Contract
A contract can be defined as an arrangement providing for (or
allowing for) the exchange of obligations and benefits
. It is a
powerful mechanism for generating what Finch (1974) refers to as
"reliable, dependable, predictable behavior."
Parties to contracts can be variously defined as the individuals,
persons or groups, participating directly or indirectly in the
contractual exchange, or secondarily if so specified, as those
affected by the exchange. The exchange may take place in the present
or future and may take the form of reciprocal expectancies e.g.
reciprocal role expectancies. When contracts extend over time, and
when future expectancies are involved, contracts become "time-
binding," "time-connecting" or "time-scheduling" (Berne, 1961;
SHistorically, the concept of exchang e as the basis for a theory
of human behavior was originally investigated in the 19th century by
two theorists working independently. Whately (1831), a political
economists in England, propounded what he called the study of
"catallactics" or science of exchange (von Mises, 1949). Somewhat
later in America, Chavannes (1884), an early sociologist, developed
a similar theoretical viewpoint (Know, 1963). Similarly, Cantril
and Bumstead (I960) traced essentially the same use of the concept,,
"transaction," back to the early Greek historian, Polybius, who held
that the history of one nation cannot be meaningfully understood
independent of its transactions with other countries.
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Frank, 1942; Fraser, 1966; Korzybski, 1933; Mowrer & Ullman, 1945).
For instance under the Feudal Societal Contract
, as it included the
law of primogeniture all status-derived prerogatives, including
real property and serfs, automatically passed to the eldest son
(Maine, 1861). However, too many instances didn't fit (e.g. no son)
and the Wi 1
1
as a contractual instrumentality was introduced to
accommodate diversified wishes and to assure that these wishes
would be carried out after one's death, reaching from one generation
into the succeeding generation (Havighurst, 1961; Hoebel
,
1954;
Maine, 1861).
Contracts cover the entire range of human exchange. This includes
the exchange of commodities or "goods" (an etymological ly significant
value term) and the exchange of behaviors, expectancies, reinforcements
(positive and negative), values, ideas, feelings, contingencies,
rights and responsibilities--whatever "currency" serves human purposes.
Contractual exchange occurs within and between all levels-of-organization
for human systems, and within and between all of the domains or
contract spheres of living. Contractual exchange characteri zes
subjects as diverse as "social institutions" (institutional behavior
and the behavior of institutions) and learning theory (including
"behavior modification" or operant conditioning procedures).
In modern society every individual is directly or indirectly
involved in organizational and institutional contracts (Pratt &
Tooley, 1967a; Pugh, 1966; Schein, 1965). Social contracts define
institutions and organizations: their values, purposes, polices, rules,
and sanctions; their resources and resource allocation systems, their
11
external and internal systems of exchange including obligations
(e.g. tasks, demands, duties, work, responsibilities), benefits
(e.g. rewards, rights, privileges, remuneration )
J
and stipulated
sanctions for execution of contract and for breach of contract
or negotiation of fraudulent contracts. These personal-organizational-
societal contracts are ends-means instrumentalities that continually
connect sets-of- consequences with sets-of-actions (formally and
informally); they are reciprocal give-and-take, give-get, do-receive,
to-from systems of contractual exchange.
The dictionary definition of exchange is "to give and receive
reciprocally." Institution is defined first as, "an established
law, custom, practice, system, etc.": and differentially, it is
also defined as, "an organization having a social, education, or
religious purpose, as a school, church, hospital, reformatory, etc. 8
Thus, Levinson and Gallagher (1964) use the language of contract and of
^Consider Parsons' (1951) use of the term remuneration : "the
attainment of ego's goals then becomes dependent on the relational
context in a double way. What he gets depends not only on what he
himself 'produces' in the sense in which this is independent of what
the alters do, but on the 'terms of exchange' that is, the patterning
of his relationship in certain respects to relevant alters. There are,
in turn, two aspects of this relational system: first, the regulation
of structuring (through settlement of terms) of the 'outflow' process
which may be called that of 'disposal' of the product of his efforts
to a class of alters; and second, the regulation of the 'inflow'
process, the settlement of the terms on which he receives contributions
to his goals for alters, which may be called his remuneration (p. 70)."
Also cited by Hittelman (1966b) in his discussion of a contractual
approach to communication theory and T-group practice (p. 6).
8Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Stein, 1966).
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contractual exchange (rights and obligations) in their conceptualiza-
tion of both institutional role and the role of institutions (particularly
mental hospitals, prisons and residential schools):
The client thus becomes a client-member, an inmate of a
community that not only offers specific services but also
makes manifold claims upon him. His membership in the
hospital involves a distinctive contract (Durkheim, 1957;
Parsons, 1957; Bidwell & Vreeland, 1963) that defines his
rights and his obligations . .
.
(p. 34). The "socializing"
institution has a " commi tment to society; it has a formal
obligation to foster the recovery of its patients, and
every patient whatever his motivation, takes on a
contractual obi igation to work toward this end (emphasis
mine, p. 39)."
Using this contractual exchange conception of role as the connecting
link it is possible to couple a psychological analysis with a
sociological-anthropological approach: "we have examined the socio-
cultural system from the perspective of its psychological meaning,
and have examined the individual personality from the perspective
of its engagement in the social environment." This provides a basis
for comparative study "of various therapeutic-educative-corrective
systems, seen from the viewpoint of their client-inmate members (p. 244)."
All role theory that intentionally or by default, attempts to
study role or role process £ejr se , disregarding content or context
can have little meaning or general izability. Here "context" of
course refers to the contract-system-field including relevant contract-
systems at all levels from societal to intrapsychic. This caveat,
regarding "empty theories" (pseudo content-free) applies equally
to all social-behavioral theories e.g. communications
theory,
learning theory, decision theory; and likewise to all
social-
13
behavioral classification systems or taxonomies. As long as contextual
stability obtains a conceptually narrow model may work quite well.
However, to the degree that relevant content and/or context are
ignored, crucial sources of variance may be overlooked. Models
can "get by" treating a "thin slice" of reality as rf it were
stable, static, self-contained, in vacuum, or absolute, only at
the risk of basic misconstruction.
In a review of Patienthood in the Mental Hospi tal : An Analysis of
Role
,
Personality and Social Structure (Pratt & Tooley, 1967b) one
can find an indication of the conceptual power of the language of
contract in providing a higher-order construct with which one can
relate and thus explicate subsidiary concepts in the critical review
of current literature. Under the title "Flattery Will Get You
Somewhere: Styles and Uses of Ingratiation," (Jones, 1965) we find
a similar illustration of the use of the language of contract in
a substantive overview of a significant book (Jones, 1964). Consider
a sample from the section headed, "Breaking the Social Contract"--
But how do we determine when behavior is "legitimate"?
Relationships and associations involve, in normal
circumstances, an unstated contract between the actors.
Different authorities describe this contract in different
ways. Sociologist Erving Goffman (1959), in his book
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life , emphasizes
what he calls "ritual elements" in social interaction.
Goffman believes that not only does communication
take place in its usual sense but the communicators
also engage in a "performance"--each transmits and
receives clues about his definition of the situation, his
view of himself, and his evaluation of the other. Mutual ad-
justment occurs. Perhaps most important the actors enter into a
14
silent compact to help each other save face. Each becomes
involved in "face-work”—give-and-take actions that smooth
over potentially embarrassing threats, lend mutual support,
and make for coherent and consistent performances. Each
person has a "defensive orientation toward saving his own
face and a protective orientation toward saving the other's
face." Within this frame of reference, the ingratiator
may be seen as exploiting this contract while seeming to
support it. He neither violates the contract openly, nor
merely fulfills it. Rather, he keeps sending out reassuring
signals that he accepts the terms of the contract ; but
all the while he is actually working toward other goals
(Jones, 1965, p. 20).
Murray intended his "personology" (Sahakian, 1965) to be a
science of men and a method of inquiry. He conceptualized personality
as a "temporal integrate of mutually dependent processes (variables)
developing in time"; and explanation of a single one of these
variables involves the recognition of a large number of others and
their reciprocal relations (p. 210). Murray used the language of
contract extensively, as in his conception of the " Ego system ".
Everyone has experienced "resolving to do something" or
"selecting a purpose" Decisions and intentions of
this sort— "accepting a goal," "planning a course of action,"
"choosing a vocation," as well as promi ses , compacts and
"taking on responsibility"... all of them (are) related
to time-binding and the establishment of expectations
and levels of aspiration We should say that such
conscious fixations of aim were organized to form the
"Ego system." The concept of Ego emphasizes the
determining significance of conscious, freely-willed
acts: making a resol ution (with oneself) or a compact
(with others) or dedi cati ng oneself to a life-long
vocation, all of which "bind" the personality over long
periods of time.... One index of the degree of structuration
or strength of the Ego is the ability of an individual to
"live by" his resolutions and compacts (Sahakian, 1965, p. 236).
15
Hi ttelman has developed aspects of contract psychology for critical
and experimental application to the prediction of changes in inter-
personal attraction (1966a); T-group theory and practice (1966b);
and to major sociological and psychological theories of psychosocial
deviance (1966c). He, again, emphasizes reciprocal behavioral
expectancies, "A contract is the mutually agreed upon (explicitly
or implicitly) expectations for behavior between two or more parties
with the rewards (and sanctions) for meeting (or violating) that
expectation. It implies not only the behavior expected, but also the
conditions and reservations under which the expectations are held
(1966c, Pp. 4-5)."
Contemporary learning theorists, suffering from a legacy of self-
imposed conceptual constraints, are currently turning to the language
of contracts to liberate even the most "operational" operant
conditioning procedures from the triple cul-de-sac of an "atheoretical
"
stance; a "value-free" posture; and an "empty organism" (S-R
versus S-O-R) paradigm (Johnson, Dokecki & Mowrer, 1972).
Sulzer (1962), for instance, must feel that he's found conceptually
strange company when he joins Menninger (1958) and Szasz (1965)
in writing extensively about the "therapeutic contract." Though
in this instance followed by something of a non sequitur Rickard
and Dinoff (1965) likewise make explicit use of the language of
contract in their case histories:
Perhaps the prime techniques used in eliciting adaptive
behavior from Bill was emphasis upon the terms of the contract .
Whenever Bill refused to take part in activities or to comply
with camp regulations alternate channels were pointed out
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to him and the expected behavior was clearly labeled in
a nonpunitive, nonjudgmental manner (p. 327).
The training films produced by Krasner and his colleagues showing
their work with autistic children vividly present the contractual
negotiation and exchange process, including specification of conditions,
choice, and reciprocal action-consequence sequences: "You give me that
and I'll give you this; If you do_ that, I'll do this. If you cto
that then you'll get to do this." A structured series of contractual
exchange events proceed in a manner designed to evoke and reinforce
desired behaviors. Reciprocal expectancies are generated for child
and "therapist"--when the child gives or does (contingency behavior)
he finds that he has a right to expect to get, or to get-to-do
(reinforcing behavior or event). Both parties are reinforced--the
child gets (gets to eat) the piece of candy and the therapist gets
to play his game and to believe in his hypothesis through out-come
determined consequation.
As Krasner (1964), Ferster (1965), Homme (1965), and several others
(Ullmann & Krasner, 1965; Ulrich, et al .
,
1966) have done, Goldiamond
has made major theoretical and empirical contributions toward a
more enlightened and sophisticated behavior theory, particularly in
such underdeveloped areas as reflexive or self-rei nforcement and self-
control, and the connection of contingencies and consequences with
value-theory and ethics (Kanfer & Phillips, 1972; Tooley, 1966a).
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Go 1 diamond (1965) states unequivocally that, "The aim in behavioral
modification of the i.ype we have been using is to alter those behaviors
about which a contractual agreement has been made implicitly or
explicitly (p. 254)."
Addison and Homme (1966) employ the language of contract in
extending operant conditioning concepts into a comprehensive motivational
system9 that includes the concept of "coverants" in the reflexive
self-management of contingencies. They use the terms "contracting
systems," "contractor" and "contingency contracts" to specify the
operational relationships between "contingent behaviors" and "reinforcing
events" (a conceptual alternative to the limiting construct "reinforcing
stimulus"). In an important essay, "Contingencies of Reinforcement in
the Design of a Culture," Skinner (1966) emphasizes the role of reinforcing
events and contingent behaviors in optimizing human systems at
individual and societal levels. The discovery and development of
reinforcing properties is equated with the "history of the discovery
of human potentialities" both positive and negative (p. 163). Skinner
stresses the actualizing role of the contingent behavior in
9
In 1966 I published a paper discussing the use of "contract
management" as an effective method of changing behavior. About the
same time, Lloyd Homme (1966) began writing about what he called
"contingency management." Behavioral ly we were both using the same
technique. Putting our heads together (Homme, 1966) we settled on
terming the technique "contingency contracting (Homme, 1969)
although one occasionally sees the term "contract contingency
management" (Kanfer & Phillips, 1970, 1972).
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carrying out the work of the world.
Men are happy in an environment in which active, productive,
and creative behavior is reinforced in effective ways. The
trouble with both affluent and welfare societies is that
reinforcers are not contingent on particular forms of
behavior. Men are not reinforced for doing anything and
hence they do nothing. This is the "contentment" of the
Arcadian idyll and of the retired businessman. It may
represent a satisfaction of needs, but it raises other
problems. Those who have nothing important to do fall
prey to trivial reinforcers Only when we stop using
reinforcers to allay needs can we begin to use them to
"fulfill man's nature" in a much more important sense.
Contingencies of reinforcement are far more important
than the reinforcers they incorporate, but they are much
less obvious. Only very recently, and then only under
rigorous experimental conditions, have the extraordinary
effects of contingencies been observed The experimental
analysis of behavior thus has a very special relevance
to the design of cultures. Only through the active
prosecution of such an analysis, and the courageous
application of its results to daily life, will it be
possible to design those contingencies of reinforcement
which will generate and maintain the most subtle and
complex behavior of which men are capable (p. 166).
It can readily be seen that for behavior theory the concept
of contract covers the exchange of obligations and benefits
which are translated as contingencies (reinforcing stimuli) and
consequences (reinforcing events). The traditional proclivity of
behaviorists for protean forms of S-R reductionism can be reduced
when behaviors are analyzed at the level of the contractual unit.
When behaviorists use the term "operant," they are by definition
referring to a means, a behavioral means to effect certain environmental
consequences. As all means are inextricably connected with ends
and
all ends represent values, operant psychology becomes
an ends-means
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psychology with a primary (inescapable) normative component. Without
exception, all of the specific operational referents of the term
"reinforcement" are value-defined. By operational definition contingency
contracts are invariably contingency-consequence contracts, they are
contingency (means )-consequence (ends) contracts, therefore, ends-means
contracts. The reinforcement-obtaining values of contingencies (of
contingency behavior) are learned through the individual's contractual
transactions with his environment. If not for rats at least for man,
reinforcement valence is largely ascribed ("catected") 10 rather than
exclusively intrinsic to given stimuli or events (Koch, 1963). Thus,
reinforcement valence cannot be accepted as an invariant given but must
be treated as preferential behavior (Becker & McClintock, 1967).
These considerations crucially qualify and must be explicitly dealt
with in all behavioral models that attempt the "classification of
behavior ( or behavior disorders ) in terms of maintaining consequences"
(Ferster, 1965; Goldiamond, 1965).
In summary, then, the following philosophical assumptions characterize
the contractual model of human behavior and social organization:
All theories of behavior implicitly or explictly postulate a
model of humanity.
It is asserted that the essence of humanity is in the capacity
to make and execute contracts.
10Because the valence of reinforcing stimuli are so frequently
ascribed an interesting phenomenological treatment of behaviorism
is now possible.
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The contract, as a theoretical construct, is the basic
level of analysis for human behavior and social organization.
To understand the process of contracting, auxiliary constructs
of exchange, role, contingencies and consequences must be
used.
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CHAPTER II
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF CONTRACT SYSTEMS THEORY
All models try to delineate reality and, as within the contract
model, also may serve as instruments in shaping reality to man's
purposes. From the contract perspective, knowing proceeds through
the partici pant- observation- intervention" of "man-in-the-uni verse.
We speak, therefore, of the epistemology of ontology
,
of knowing and
the existential reality of the knower and the known, of becomi no and
the "to-be-known." Thus, theoretical models are shaped by epistemology
and ontology whose basic assumptions
, explicitly or implicitly,
O
reach through each and every model.
Epistemology refers to the process of knowing
,
the relationship
of the knower to the known, to man's reflexive study of man and his
iFor this transactional -field epistemolo gy even the concept
"observation" would be analyzed within the transactional-field as
comprised of: (1) observer ; (2) the system observed ; (3) the
observational process per se ; (4) the observational or protocol
data; and (5) the inferential products of observation (theories,
laws, hypotheses). All of these aspects of observation are treated
as being transacti onally interrelated (Pratt & Tooley, 1968; Tooley
& Pratt, 1964).
2 in all scientific work, theoretical or experimental, one chooses
and acts in terms of underlying assumptions whether he knows it or not.
In his "metatheoretical analysis of the role of assumptions" Handlon
(1960) emphasizes that, "Whenever a worker in the area of mental
disorders goes about his job--be he therapist, theoretician, or
research investigator— he carries around with him certain assumptions
At whatever level of awareness these assumptions reside, they obviously
exert a pervasive influence upon what the worker does (p. 43)."
The role of implicit, as well as explicit, assumptions is receiving
increasing attention in the literature. See Newbury's, The Siginficance
of Assumptions and Philosophic Operations in Psychological Methodology
(1958); Van Kaam's Assumptions in Psychology (1958); Barber's
Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery (1960); and Kaplan's,
The Conduct of Inquiry : Methodology for Behavioral Science (1964).
22
surroundings (Grene, 1966). All scientific inquiry and all social
action--the sciences, humanities, and the arts--are all aspects of
the human endeavor, forms of human action and thus part of the
historical purview of psychology (Boring, 1929; Popper, 1972).
As all of the social-behavioral sciences are ultimately based on
human behavior and human relationships, psychology becomes, as
Stevens (1936) said, "the propaedeutic science." In his compelling
call for theories of complexity and prodigality, "Psychological
science versus the science-humanism antinomy: Intimations of a
significant science of man." Koch (1961) put epistemology in
psychology's lap, "It is, incidentally, my growing conviction that
many problems still allocated to epistemology will receive little
further clarification until they are recognized for the psychological
problems they are (p. 637)."
As have others (Dewey & Bentley, 1949), Pratt and I earlier
presented a taxonomy of epistemologies which takes the position that
all epistemologies can be ordered into one or another of three
fundamental types: (1) auto- actional epistemologies; (2) inter-
actional epistemologies; (3) trans- actional epistemologies (Pratt &
Tooley, 1967d; Pratt & Tooley, 1968). The choice between these three
epistemological positions is crucial for the construction of specific
models of behavior (Dubin, 1969). The conceptual advantage of the
transactional approach is being increasingly recognized for psychology,
psychiatry, communication theory, education, biosocial sciences, and
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for science generally. 3 In Explorations in Transactional Psychology
,
edited by Kilpatrick (1961a), we find the following:
Our work has been aimed at a systematic examination of such
problems (i.e. in the field of perception), and out of this
examination there has been developed a basic formulation
concerning the nature of knowing and of observation
This basic theory is one which has else where been called
"transactional." According to this view, living is an
enormously complex evolving process which includes space and
time and environment, as well as the organism, in an indissoluble
whole. A segment in time of this process may be labeled a
"transaction" (Dewey) or "occasion" (Whitehead) in which all
aspects of the process are contained, including purposes, past
experience in the form of assumptions, and the future in the
form of expectancies. Cantril (1950, p. 59) explains this
position in the following way: "Each transaction of living
involves numerous capacities and aspects of man's nature
v/hich operate together. Each occasion of life can occur
only through an environment; is imbued with some purpose;
requires action of some kind, and the registration of the
consequences of the action. Every action is based upon some
awareness or perception, which in turn is determined by the
assumptions brought to the occasion. All of these processes
are interdependent. No one process could function without
the others (p. 3)."
Epistemological consideration of the total relevant contractual-
field from the transactional perspective helps prevent reductionism--
whether intrapsychic as in psychoanalytic or cultural or as in
3jhat the transactional mode of inquiry may prove to be the most
productive for all fields of inquiry is illustrated in the work of
Bentley (1935, 1954); Dewey & Bentley (1949); Cantril, Ames, Hastorf
and Ittleson (1949); von Bertalanffy (1952); Cantril and Bumstead (1960);
Berne (1961); Grinker, MacGregor, Selan, Klein & Kohrman (1961);
Kilpatrick (1961a, 1961b); Miller (1965); Cantril (1964); Hayakawa
(1955); Bauer (1966); and Spiegal (1971) among others.
4one extreme is to regard all behaviors as being initiated completely
from v/ i thin the organism. "The one-sided inadequacy of this view is
what so often has called out an equally one-sided opposed view, according
to which the organism is wholly passive, and is gradually molded into
shape and adapted to living by independent environmental conditions,
mechanistically treated. Both of these views, one as much as the other
are alien to us (Dewey & Bentley, 1949; p. 143)."
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absolute cultural relativism (the person as putty). 4 Transactional
epistemology, by requiring that meaning be derived from the nature
of the transaction itself, also precludes both the mechanistic and
reductionists misinterpretations of whole and part processes
characteristic of most traditional theory and practice (Cantril,
1964; Hayakawa, 1955; Kilpatrick, 1961).
The contract as a theoretical construct represents the conceptualiza-
tion of a higher-order (exclusively human) form of transaction.
Contract systems theory employs an explicitly transactional epistemology,
which it extends into a " field-theoretical 11 approach.
Now to shift to the problem of ontology. For ontology, the search
(and research) is for the most useful key conceptual tools with which
to explicate and articulate the nature of "being," of "being-in-the-
world," and the "world-to-be-known." Put pragmatically, the question
is what are some of the most useful ways for laying out patterns for
the reality of an every-changing world.
Contract systems theory puts together all the major pieces of the
pattern through the conceptual architecture of its heuristic-normative-
nomological-network . Not a simple construction but economical
considering what it covers.
This 1 eve! -of-accoun ting links ontology with epistemology through
the common-ground concept of "transactional-field" which they
substantively share. The transactional-field (contractual-field
for human systems) encompasses the human enterprise (human "condition,
"predicament") through the concept of "transactional-field" which
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has its conceptual-methodological roots in several significant
theories and constructs. These include: Feibleman's (1954) theory
of "integrative levels"; Novikoff's (1945) concept of "levels of
organization"; Weaver's (1948) "theory of complexity"; Kantor's
(1953, 1959) "levels of participant-observation" and "levels of
interpersonal interaction"; and Kaplan's (1964) "levels of abstraction."
Within the total contract-systems field, we are concerned with human
systems at all levels
,
from interior "intrapsychic" contract-system
space to international contract-system space. As systems at the various
levels are transactionally interrelated, change in any one may be
contingent upon change in related systems (to one degree or another;
to what degree being a matter for empirical determination) .5
As each different system can only be understood in relation to
others, to study (or change) any one system at a given level nothing
less than a general systems theory can be adequate. Thus, our contractual-
field concept combines theories of levels with general systems theory
(von Berta! affy, 1962).
Another basic epistemological-onotological problem is reflected
in the need for conceptual tools with which to link theories with
empirical events . Since Bergman and Spence's (1941) excellent
discussion of the theoretical and empirical components of science
5jake for example the current energy shortage as a single variable
that effectslevels of systems from the individual to the international.
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appeared over twenty-five years ago, several theoreticians have
conceptualized the complementary interrelationships of science's
empirical and theoretical elements in various forms. Margenau (1950),
for instance, has elaborated a spacial paradigm comprised of blending
planes of existence, the inferential or Conceptual Plane (C-Plane)
connecting with the empirical, observable or Protocol Plane (P-Plane). 6
Dealing with the same problem, Feigl and Scriven (1956) first
introduced the notion of a "nomological net" to encompass and relate
the various levels of theoretical constructs with their referential
events . These schema, including Kaplan's (1964) "empirical-theoretical
continuum," can be selectively combined and then used in connection
with Northrop's (1947) concept of "epistemic correlation" which
provides for "indices of correspondence" between C-Plane and P-Plane
i.e, between theoretical constructs and empirical events.
Contract systems theory gives high priority to the incorporation
of questions of value and human purpose-- to the axiology of praxiology
(Kotarbinski
,
1965). Value theory and action theory are conceptualized
^Whether one chooses to consider the P-Plane as operational data
per se
,
as perceptions, phenomena, on noumena, or as simply a first-
order conceptual function is an interesting question but too
specialized for this purpose.
Attempts have been made to differentiate the concepts of "theory,
"system" and "models" in science on the basis of whether or not they
link the C and P-Planes or are confined to relationships exclusively
within one or the other of the two planes. An analogous differentiation
between the terms "construct" and "concept" has often been advocated.
These differential definitions, however, have not stuck too well
and the terms are frequently used interchangeably.
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as transactior.ally coupled and as an inextricable part of the total
transactional-field (Brooks, 1973) extend Feigl and Scriven's
nomological net to incorporate hierarchical levels of ends-means
configurations. Thus, the nomological net becomes a normative-
nomological network. By combining the nomological net with the
normative net, we place the theoretical -empirical components of
existence (Margenau) within an ends-means context: the normative-
nomological network. Thus, it is possible to also extend Northrup's
construct of "epistemic correlation," defining the degree or
correspondence (validity) between theory and its empirical referent,
to include value-theory
,
to include the degree or correspondence between
a given value theory and its specific empirical referent (Rapoport,
1953).
If one posits a transactional relationship between ends and means,
then "ends-means" must be treated as inseparable (irreducible)
configurations. Scientific inquiry, the arts, ethics, the humanities
—
as human endeavor--can be considered as ends-means activities
(Aschenbrenner, 1972; Weinberg, 1970). Churchman, in Predi cti on
and Optimal Decision , (1964); Rapoport, in Operational Philosophy :
Integrating Knov/ledge and Action , (1953); Cattell (1973) in Objecti ve
Knowledge have each developed this argument in great -detail with an
emphasis on experimental, mathematical and operational constructs.
They all present an excellent analysis of ends-means taxonomies.
Kluckhohn and colleagues (1952) have done likewise and have also
covered much of the current thinking on the complex interrelationships
(if not "identity") of "fact" and "value." 7
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In discussing the relationship between normative and existential
(i.e., nomological) propositions Kluckhohn agrees with Lepley (1943)
who in his paper, "The Identity of Fact and Value" points out that:
The belief that valuative statements as expressive of means-
ends relations are inherently different from scientific pro-
positions as denoting cause-effect relations has apparently
risen, as has the view that valuative sentences are less
verifiable than factual statements, from failure to see that
the whole gamut of events and relations can be referred to
by both forms of statement... (p. 391).
Kluckhohn (1952) also concurs with the Cornell value-study group that,
The concept "value" supplies a point of convergence for the
various specialized social sciences, and is a key concept
for the integration with studies in the humanities. Value
is potentially a bridging concept which can link together many
diverse specialized studies--from the experimental psychology
of perception to the analysis of political ideologies, from
budget studies to economics to aesthetic theory and philosophy
of language, from literature to race riots
Sophisticated use of value-theory can help to correct the
wide-spread static-descriptive bias of social sciences.
The pervasive emphasis, for example, upon static-equilibrium
theories in economics; upon "social structure" in sociology:
upon static "need-reduction" theories of personality in
psychology (p. 389).
Epistemologically speaking, all knowing , including scientific
inquiry as a course of action, proceeds through explicit or covert
ends-means activities involving a complex series of valuations or
judgments e.g. decision to investigate in the first place, formulation
of any given problem, selection of methodology, decisions regarding
significance levels, utilization of feedback to modify theory and
7$ee particularly their chapter "Values and Value-Orientations in the
Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classification"
in
Parsons' Toward a General Theory of Action (1952).
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methodology, etc. (Brooks, 1973). 8 The social psychological
experimental literature reflects a new and growing interest in the
empirical investigation of ends-means attributable sources of
variance (MdGuigan, 1963; Riecken, 1962; Rosenthal, 1963a, 1963b,
1964; Sarason, 1951).
Historically, traditional experimentalists have characteristically
given intrusive value-variance the ostrich treatment. They have
tried to control it directly, or to statistically control it— to
"partial it out." Trying the opposite tack, there are methodologies
through which ends-means variance could be purposively "partialed in"
and put to work. Also, in addition to showing how "experimenter
variance" and "experimental situational demands" (Orne, 1962)
can be exploited, we have pointed out how such shibboleths as
subjects' "Knowledge of hypothesis" or "personal-stake-in-outcome"
can be made an explicit part of the design in "participant-social-
action-research" (Epstein, Suedfeld & Silverstein, 1973; Pratt &
Tooley, 1967d; Tooley, Pratt & Rosenthal, 1964). Whether one tries
®Smith (1954) makes the same point in relation to scientific and
professional responsibility: "The psychologist cannot stop making
choices, as scientist, teacher, therapist, or human engineer. The
choices may be witting or unwitting, responsible or irresponsible,
but they are made and they entail consequences... the claim to a
value-free science... only obscures the value elements in the choice
of the problem, of research setting, of conceptual framework, in
the decision to rest with negative findings, when results are
reportable, and so on endlessly. Only if we know what we are choosing,
only if the values involved in our choices are explicit, do our
decisions become responsible ones (p. 515)."
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to avoid the embarrassment of having ubiquitous value-connected
variance cropping up as unwelcome "error variance," or whether one
plans to exploit ends-means variance by putting it to work-in
either case it must be identified for what it is. Thus, to be
scientifically honest or to maximize payoff, all ends-means derived
sources of variance (whether associated with subjects, experimenters
or other "situational demands") must be made explicit for all
scientific inquiry, in laboratory or in situ . I have labeled this
methodological requirement "the principle of axiological specification"
(Tooley, 1965; Tooley, Pratt & Rosenthal, 1 964
)
9
which will be
explicated in the following chapter.
^Though not appreciating the positive potential of value-derived
variance, Myrdal (1944) did realize that the epistemological doctrine
of Wertfreihert was doomed to failure: "Valuations are present in
our problems even if we pretend to expel them. The attempt to
eradicate biases by trying to keep out the valuations themselves
is a hopeless and misdirected venture There is no other device
for excluding biases in the social sciences than to face the valuations
and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific, and sufficiently
concretized value premises (p. 1943-1944)."
Newbury (1958) has emphasized the need to make implicit philosophical
assumptions publicly available to the scientific community, "However
much understanding of his own meanings a psychologist might have
without conscious definition of his own philosophic operations, he
could not be expected to understand adequately the concepts communicated
by others without knowing their philosophic operations. Professor
Boring's History of Experimental Psychology is monumental evidence
of this fact (p. 190).'
Axiological specification is crucial for scientific operations
generally, and particularly for those dealing with human behavior.
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A model that incorporates both axiology and praxiology is
crucial for theories of action or change-agentry for systems theory
(Brooks, 1973; Kuhn, 1974). It is for this reason that Feigl's
objectivity-delineating nomological-net must be enlarged into a
normati ve -nomol ogi cal network making explicit value parameters of
the systems involved.
When we lay out a scientific pattern for reality, we set out to
look for variance. For scientific inquiry, variance is the name
of the game (Popper, 1972). Now we have said that our network was
to be an heuristic network. By heuristic I mean creative, educational
ways in which to engage reality and ways to get at reality (and
variance) from several perspectives:
1. What is (the basic descriptive process)
2. What can be (given what is, under existing circumstances)
3. What could be (contingent upon genotypic or radical change:
"if so, then so")
4. What ought to be (relatively "intrinsic" to highly relative)
5. Emergent nomological conditions (substantive, process, events--
such as the reality of new theories and constructs)
6. Emergent ends -means configurations (within open-ended
heirarchical ends-means systems)
7. Emergent potentialities (as contrasted with the Aristotelian
concept of potentialities invariably being pre-set,
intrinsic to the organism or system)
8. Creation of new existential realities (normative and nomological)
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This heuristic perspective serves to discover (approximate) what
is, explore what can or could be, stimulate innovation and continuously
create new psychosocial realities (Boguslaw, 1968; Churchman, 1972).
In this version of an heuristic model I consider "discovery"
and "invention" to be transactional ly related aspects of social
action or scientific inquiry which are carried out within the context
of the larger, relevant transactional-field. Though Asher's (1964)
distinction is semantically somewhat arbitrary, it is conceptually
sound:
There is a distinction between discovery and invention
which should be discussed. Discovery seems to refer to a
new concept which gives fresh understanding to an existing
structure such as Harvey's concept of how blood-circulation
functioned. The discovery of a new concept for some aspect
of an existing structure or existing system transforms
that which was invisible into something which is visible.
And once visibility is achieved with the new concept
experiments can be designed to test the veracity of
the proposed concept. Invention is to create structures
or systems which were not previously in existence such as
Edison's electric light or Bell's telephone. For psychology,
both discovery and invention are relevant directions of
work but the latter should be more predominant. For
example, if we are interested in how behavior functions,
this research activity results in discovery. If we want
to evoke or even modify human behavior, this will require
invention (p. 88).
Tart and Creighton (1966) shift the emphasis even further when they
state that, "The basic philosophical or existential assumption is
that we do not di scover our answers i n 1 i fe , we create them (p. 3)."
Schaefer states that, "Modern science can affect life patterns
in two ways: (1) by an analysis of human behavior, and (2) by
creating new conditions of life (Schaefer, 1967, p. 1).
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From the heuristic viewpoint, the representation of "present"
reality is conditioned by potentialities for change: change through
expected or unexpected emergents or through direct intervention. As
Lewin said, one can only understand a system by changing it. And
II
(by Godel's 1963 theorem) one can only change a "closed" or complex
system by transcending it: the conceptual -methodological break-
through (Kuhn, 1962). "Hard facts" can never be treated as anything
more than systems of inferences derived from sets of assumptions
(Popper, 1972). The hardest of hard facts are still approximations
of approximations, frequently up-ended by unpredicted (if not unpredictable)
emergents or by restructuring of the relevant field (Kuhn, 1962).
In the social -behavioral sciences as in the physical sciences,
this heuristic approach takes into account and attempts to exploit
not only the concept of "degrees- of-freedom" but also of the totally
unpredictable "surprise," of qua! i tati ve change where quantitative
change was predicted (Bronowski, 1956; Heisenberg, 1958, 1971;
Oppenheimer, 1956). This heuristic open-point-of-view provides
for evaluation of degrees of system openness and of the relationships
between closed and open-systems. Thus the present "variance potential"
of "futures" can be formulated as hypotheses (often as "outrageous
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hypotheses") to be empirically tested sequentially over time (Lynd, 1939). 10
It is interesting that two decades ago, from a behavioristic learning
theory orientation, Shaw (1948, 1949a, 1949b) first introduced the
concept of "bringing home" future consequences. He used this notion
of connecting distant or long-range consequences with present conduct
as the key concept for this theory of psychotherapy. The failure
to make or maintain time-binding connections between positive and
negative future consequences and present actions was central to his
theory of psychological disorders (Mowrer, 1947; Mowrer & Ullman, 1945).
^Murphy (1963) devoted a significant section of his paper on
major trends and future developments in psychology to the overriding
need for outrageous hypotheses, "Only insofar as he encourages
outrageous hypotheses and dares entertain notions which are anathema
to his scientific brethren, can he really pry loose the lid of the
Pandora box in which all the exciting bugs and all the frightful
stingers lie. Partly he will get into these new paths by trying
to use the existing paths to change things. He will, as Marx
suggested, decide that it is impossible to know what reality is,
but that it is possible to learn something about it by changing it.
My eyes were opened and my brain sobered one day in a conversation
with my colleague, C.M. Sol ley, with whom I was talking about
some research problems as to the nature of human self-deception.
I said very solemnly to Charlie, "I've looked down from the
hilltops into the valley many times, trying to see the point from
which that path down in the valley leads on up to the hilltops."
With a broad grin, he replied, "But, Gardner, there isn't any path
there. You have to make that path." This is more than extra-
polation. This is what the really significant scientists will
have to do. This really is the reason why sheer extrapolation
along known paths, though yielding exquisite results, will usually
fall short of the great discoveries. This is why the visionary
will go far beyond the hay-foot, straw-foot extrapolator (p. 693)."
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The purpose of this chapter has been to present the basic
epistemological and ontological assumptions of contract systems
theory. The point has been to not overlook any major sources of
variance; to cover the maximum relevant sources of variance that
can be put to work for human purposes; and to treat these purposes
themselves as an integral part of the social reality (Friedlander, 1972).
"Representativeness of circumstances" is better assured through the
heuri sti
c
-normati ve -nomol ogi cal -network . This conceptual synthesis
represents a more comprehensive frame-of-reference than Feigl's
original construct of nomological net. This comprehensiveness is
not to complicate scientific or social inquiry but to simplify it,
to make it at the same time increasingly more effective for the
ultimate purpose of human actualization (Dubos, 1970).
To summarize this chapter, the following points are highlighted:
The explicit, conscious choice of a transactional
epistemology over more primitive auto-actional and
interactional epistemologies.
The inescapable place of values in all human affairs--
including the study of behavior--necessi tates the inclusion
of an axiological component of science as well as the
theoretical and empirical components.
The study of variance, in all its forms, is the basis for
scientific inquiry.
To study variance comprehensively, a general systems approach
is preferred.
New social realities are more often created or invented
than discovered.
CHAPTER III
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AXIOLOGICAL SPECIFICATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY
For over thirty years the social and behavioral sciences
have been struggling with a new mandate. This mandate was
perhaps first forcefully articulated in 1939 by Robert S. Lynd
in his impressive volume, Knowledge for What? and brought
home twenty years later by C. Wright Mills (1959) in The
Sociological Imagination
. In essence this mandate calls upon
members of the social and behavioral sciences to reassess their
professional-scientific contract and apply their skills and
knowledge to the social problems and international crises of our
time:
Social science is not a scholarly arcanum, but an
organized part of the culture which exists to help
man in continually understanding and rebuilding his
culture. And it is the precise character of a
culture and the problems it presents as an instrument
for furthering men's purposes that should determine
the problems and, to some extent, the balance of
methods of social science research (Lynd, 1939, p.
ix).
Implicit in Lynd's remarks is an important shift of
the ends-means relationship between science and society.
This shift requires that science no longer remain an isolated
social institution with no purpose other than the creation
of new knowledge; it must in addition become a higher-level
means of accelerating the progress of the civilization from
which it has sprung (Dubos, 1970; Friedlander, 1972; Gouldner,
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1970). 1
In this new mandate, then, is the modern genesis of the
prescriptive sciences (Watson, 1967). These new, emergent sciences
go beyond the traditional scientific functions of description,
prediction and control, taking on the specifically normative
function of specifying alternatives of "what could be" as well
as the function of devising strategies and methodologies for
transforming "what is" to "what could be" (Pratt & Tooley,
1968). This explicitly normative, social conscious orientation
has been variously expressed in intervening years and has
taken such forms as: "policy science" (Cantril, 1967; Lerner &
Lasswell, 1951), "action anthropology" (Borman, 1960, 1963;
Redfield, 1963; Tax, 1952), "action psychology" (Pratt &
^This ends-means reversal has been succinctly put by George
Sarton (1962):
Science must be humanized, which means among other
things that it must not be permitted to go on a
rampage. It must be an integral part of our culture
and must remain a part of it subservient to the rest
(p. 185).
Sarton's view is somewhat lopsided, however. A transactional
perspective in which science and the broader culture could
serve to enhance and control and thereby actualize each other
reciprocally seems more appropriate to the best interests
of each (Blissett, 1972).
Consider also the purpose of Harvard Research center in
Creative altruism: "The moral transformation of man and man-
made universe is the most important item on today's agenda
of history (McEwen, 1963, p. 29)."
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Tooley, 1967d), the "new sociology" (Horowitz, 1964; Mills,
1959) and the emerging "social design perspective" in sociology
(Boguslaw, 1965, 1968; Tooley, 1974). It is also reflected
in recent attempts to integrate the axiological aspect of
science with its theoretical and empirical components and
thus bring an integrated "science of man" to bear on the
problems of mankind (Becker, 1968; Pratt & Tooley, 1968). 2
^Ernest Becker's (1968), The Structure of Evil : An Essay on
the Unification of the Science of Man
,
is one of the most ambitious
attempts to relate the science of man to the problems of our times:
Measured against the needs of the times there is nothing
remotely resembling a science of man: there are only
mountains of disciplinary journals, and hordes of busy
specialists; what is their effectiveness in relation
to the momentous problems of survival and human dignity
in our time? To ask the question is already to answer
it: taken separately, most of the disciplinary activity
in the social sciences represents trival work. True,
it is hard-working, certainly well-intentioned at
times deeply hopeful and anxious--but still somehow
very much beside the point of the problems of man in
contemporary society. Many social scientists are of
course stoically unconcerned about relating science
to the problems of their time. They cling to the
faith in disinterested cumulative science, and believe
that science will somehow automatically benefit man,
if only it is left alone and heavily subventioned.
Judged by the needs of the times this faith seems
arrogant; judged by the evidence of history, it is
naive—and science judges on evidence. Even more,
judged by history, this faith in some future apotheosis
of science is a teleology that is absolutely and
blindly in error. The physical sciences took three
hundred odd years to demonstrate it; the social
scientists have been trusting in their future for
over a century and a half. Meanwhile, the world continues
to be manipulated by politicians in power, by warlords
and special -i nterest groups who scoff at social
science, or use what they know to further their own
profit, and by hate and fear (Becker, 1968, Pp. x-xiy.
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Indicating ties between professional responsibility and
social concern on one hand, and what scientists know and the
social problems of the world on the other, Robert Lindner (1952)
clearly stated the professional obligations inherent in the new
mandate for the social and behavioral sciences:
Together with many other psychologists I hold that the
data of our science place a certain responsibility on
those of us who study it, and especially upon those of
us who practice its arts of application. It seems
to me that there is a straight line from what we
know to what we must do about this knowledge. I
believe that discovery and conviction oblige action.
Accordingly I believe that it devolves upon psychologists
to place themselves in the vanguard of those forces
which are operating for social change, for the
improvement of the world as place to live in, for the
betterment of the human condition (p. 216).
At the same time Warren Bennis (1963b) has emphasized the
new action value-orientation for social and behavioral scientists
as change-agents:
These signs, and others to be detailed, all point in the
same direction: toward an emerging action role for the
behavioral scientist. While there has always been a
liaison between social knowledge and action... it is
my contention that this new role is qualitatively
different from former utilization of knowledge. It
is based on better and more differentiated laws of
human behavior; it receives its impetus as much from
the urge to improve society as from simple curiosity
about its working... it grows out of the experience
of a number of social scientists as practitioners,
who are as intimately involved in affecting change
as they are in studying it.... In short, behavioral
scientists are not only interpreting the world in
different ways; some intend to change it (Pp. 126-127).
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Parallel to these events, and at various points inter-
secting, we are witnessing the rapid development of new social
and behavioral science technologies and the concomitant growth
of new prescriptive or operational disciplines (Ruesch, 1966)
that are set to bring about social change. These new^
professional hybrids cross many disciplinary lines and include:
Operations analysts
Communications engineers
Computer programmers
Systems analysts
Behavioral engineers
Management scientists
Systems engineers
Social planners
Information scientists
Social systems designers
We are particularly concerned with these disciplines because
(1) social and behavior change are their defined goals, and (2) the
discrepancy between the operations of their practitioners
and the philosophical model of science they espouse presents
a_ clear-cut case of the inadequacy of a_ prevailing scientific
paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; Watson, 1967). The paradigm in question.
30ther "older" professions also fall squarely within the
prescriptive domain including educators, politicians, psycho-
therapists, military officers, lawyers, clergymen and government
officials. Yet beset by a pseudo value-free philosophy on one
hand, and the lack of a rational axiological basis for a
science of operations on the other, they frequently fail to
conceptualize their professions as prescriptive disciplines.
Unfortunately the newer disciplines are in large part guilty
of the same axiological peccadillo.
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of course, is the wertfrei concept of science which is modal
(if not model) in these operational disciplines and the social
sciences more generally. Practi tioners of these disciplines
habitually act like "value-free" scientists4 while their daily
operations typically consist of:
(1) Arriving at axiological decisions regarding the goals
and objectives to be achieved,
(2) Making praxiological decisions between the alternative
means available,
(3) Limiting the range of behavioral alternatives in
given man-machine and social systems and frequently
specifying the negative and positive sanctions
to accompany the prescribed behaviors,
(4) Applying their prescribed technology to goals prescribed
by themselves or, for the Gurkhas in the ranks,
ends specified by management, the military or whomever
the "client" might be.
5
his role they pull off with less than Stanislavsky precision
and credibility in spite of the fact that most were thoroughly
drilled in the "value-free" lore prevalent in most graduate school
departments. To the extent they do make the role believable
to themselves and others, these people are victims of Veblen's
(1899) "trained incapacity" and Warnotte's (1937) "professional
deformation" (Denzin, 1974).
5Elsewhere we and others (e.g. Baritz, 1960; Horowitz, 1963;
Kaplan, 1964; Roth, 1962) have criticized professionals'
uncritical acceptance of the values of their clients (Pratt &
Tooley, 1968). Typical of this professional value-orientation is that
found among many management scientists and systems analysts
and has been elegantly stated by Smith and Marney (1961) in
their definition of the mission of management science: "To
recommend to a client a DECISION i n terms of his VALUE system
and by a method which i s complementary to , and conformal with
the scientific method Jp. 4, emphasis thei rs)7"
Unfortunately, many scientists in this country and more
dramatically in Germany during the Hitlerzeit, have followed
this algorithm faithfully with monstrously dystopian consequences
for mankind.
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Thus, erstwhile "value-free" scientists daily engage in
highly normative professional behavior and are confronted with
a classic problem in cognitive dissonance--al 1 too frequently
resolved by compartmentalization, repression, the Gurkha stance,
or what Boring (1964) appropriately labeled "a preference for
certain kinds of ignorance." 6
Frequently these decisions, actions and designs have profound
implications and consequences for human affairs at all levels
far beyond those envisioned by the orginators of the system--
unanticipated secondary consequences (Tooley, 1974). These
implications have been spelled out in detail in particular
reference to computer-based systems in Boguslaw's (1965) work,
The New Utopians- -A Study of System Design and Social Change
The point, of course, is a simple one. In the sociology,
the tasks set for these computerized equipment systems
prescribe behavior patterns within a social system.
Any computer program or hardware complex that sets
forth operational procedures is, in fact, specifying
details of permissible social action. Behaviors not
specified are more than il legal --they are not possible
(p. 5).
^Ernest Nagel (1962) reserves harsher words for this implicit
philosophy and terms it a "malicious philosophy of science."
On the other hand, every rational appraisal of values
must take cognizance of the finds of the natural and
social sciences; for if the existential conditions and
consequences of the realization of values are not noted,
acceptance of a scheme of values is a species of
undisciplined romanticism (p. 638).
See also Alfred Adler's excellent article (1972) "Science
and Evil," arguing that science is our best weapon against moral
decay.
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The dilemma--and subsequent embarrassment--lies in the
fact that existing models of science constructed upon the
familiar wertfrei
, descriptive-predictive paradigm fail to
provide an adequate basis for the rational, axiological analysis
of prescriptive decisions and actions. Reconciliation of this
major metascientific problem requires minimally:
Radical reconstruction of the metathoreti cal -philosophical
base of scientific actions, specifically integrating
the normative component of science with the theoretical
and empirical components (Marney & Smith, 1961; Pratt &
Tooley, 1967d, 1968; Tooley & Pratt, 1964; Tooley, 1965). 7
The development of systematic, empirically based
scientific axiologies (Becker & McClintock, 1967;
Churchman, 1964; Hartman, 1967; Rapoport, 1953;
Weinberg, 1970) as well as praxiologies (Kotarbi nski
,
1965) for the sciences generally, and the prescriptive-
operational disciplines in particular (Aschenbrenner,
1972).
7|\|icholas Smith and Milton Marney are presently engaged in
this important metatheoretical reconstruction which is to
appear in book-form entitled. Foundations of the Prescriptive
Sciences :
Under the concept "prescriptive science" we address the
domain of professionally recommended decisions in general,
with major emphasis on methodological issues. Problems
of professional practice in the management sciences
represent our initial concern, but it is evident that
a coalescence with medical-psychiatric, legal-ethical,
economic and general scientific-advisory practices
must be accommodated by any thoroughly persuasive
philosophical reconstruction that aims at the
explication of a legitimate normative mode of rational
analysis for professional practice (Marney, 1968).
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The construction of an alternative paradigm to replace the
wertfrei concept of scientific objectivity.
For the remainder of this chapter we shall be concerned principally
with the latter task. After a brief epistemological and historical
analysis of the prevailing notion of "scientific objectivity,"
we shall articulate an alternative paradigm, axiological specification—
a general systems approach to the problem (Pratt & Tooley, 1967d;
Tooley & Pratt, 1964; Tooley, 1965).
Scienti fi c Objectivity as an Historical Paradi gm
Historically the behavioral and social sciences have inherited
(or according to some "expropriated") a model of science from the
"physical" and "natural" sciences of the nineteenth century. This
model was in large part the product of an era characterized by
radical positivism, the enthronement of unbounded rationality and
an overevaluation of the physical sciences due principally to the
spectacular successes of Newtonian mechanics. 8 Leading spokesmen
for this model were the physicist, Ernst Mach (1907) and his disciple,
8This overestimation of the "hard" sciences, the abuse of their
models (London, 1944, 1949) and subsequent "physics-envy" on the
part of the social and behavior scientists has even drawn criticism
from such eminent physicists as Max Born (1964), Robert Oppenheimer
(1956), Erwin Schrodinger (1956) and Weizacker (1952). In Oppenheimer'
s
wohis:
Physics has a special meaning for the word "classic;" classic
means wrong, it means a wrong view that was held to be right a
little while ago )p. 130)... it seems to me that the worst of
all possible misunderstandings would be that psychology be
influenced to model itself after a physics which is not there
any more, which has been quite outdated (1956, p. 134).
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Karl Pearson (1911). Mach, in fact, was such an ardent and articulate
spokesman that the view came to be known as Machian positivism
(Blackmore, 1972; Schrodinger, 1956). From the philosophical-
epistemological view of Machian positivism, "scientific objectivity"
was to be achieved by assiduously adhering to the criteria implicit
in the following cherished and unquestioned epistemological assumptions:
1. The doctrine of Wertfreiheit which holds that science
is by definition neutral in regard to values and values
per se are anathema in scientific inquiry.
2. The doctrine of Observability which states that data
are admissible as scientific evidence to the extent
they are directly observable.
3. The doctrine of Objecti vation which lays claim to the
existence of an objectified world standing completely
independent of the cognizing "subject"^ and its
derivative corollary, "the principle of least
interference.
"
This model of science and derivative conception of "scientific
objectivity" has atavistically manifested itself in this century
as logical positivism and in some forms of behaviorism and operationism
9The dichotomous nature of this epistemological assumption and
the corresponding subject-object morphology of the English language
makes almost any discussion of the "topic" (I deliberately refrain
from using the word, "subject") take on an Alice-in-Wonderland quality:
A look at the meanings of observer, observing, and the
observed (as the object of observation), leads one to the
interesting etymology, epistemology and kinds of meanings
object, objective, objectivism, etc. Meanings that are
not only semantically varied, but at variance with each
other, having referents that run the gamut from near
identities, to mutually exclusive, to diametrically
_
opposite (Dewey, 1955). As Alice asked, 'The question
is whether you can make words mean so many different
things.' To which Humpty-Dumpty replied, 'When I use
a word, it means just what I choose it to mean neither
more or less.' (Pratt & Tooley, 1967a, Pp. 166-167).
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and has since dominated thought and action in the social sciences
to the present time. This in spite of the fact that radical
positivism's progenitor, physics, abandoned the model long ago as
obsolescent in the light of such empirical evidence as Heisenberg's
(1958, 1971) principle of uncertainty and its implications of the
inescapable effects of the observer upon certain observed systems
and Bohr's formulation of complementarity demonstrating the effects
of the observer's theoretical frame-of-reference upon data collected
(Heisenberg, 1971).
In a well -documented critique of a number of positivism's
assumptions (including the doctrine of observability) von Mises
(1949) agrues that:
Only in recent years have (physicists) begun to see the limits
of their endeavors and abandoning the excessive pretensions
of older physicists, discovered the "uncertainty principle."
They realize today that there are unobservables whose un-
observability is a matter of epistemological principle (p. 57).
Attacking the doctrine of observability from within, Schrodinger (1956),
the Nobel prize-winning physicist, charges that radical positivists
in physics:
...believe they have in Mach's principle (i.e. observability)
found a wonderful way out of this dilemma which frees us from
the obligation to search for clear conceptions of Nature by
condemning the belief in them as gross superstition Why.
should we here be allowed to take recourse to an epistemological
principle as an excuse for our failures (Pp. 196-197)?
In regard to the doctrine of objecti vation , Schrodinger is
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equally critical
:
Objectivation : By this we mean what is also called the hypothesis
of a real world around us. It is not trival that we are dealing
here, as I maintain, with an at first unconscious and incomplete
simplification of the problem of nature by preliminary exclusion
of the cognizing subject from the complex of what is to be
understood. The fact that objectivation amounts to the
retreat of one's own person into the role of an onlooker who
himself does not belong in the picture, is veiled by the
following two consecutive circumstances. First of all, my
body, to which my mental life proves to be so directly attached,
is part of the object, the real external world which I construct.
Secondly, the same holds true for the bodies of other people,
if it appears natural to include one's own sphere of consciousness
in the real world, this holds even more so for the spheres of
consciousness attached to other bodies, those usually being
hypostatized as essentially different from one's own conscious-
ness. This inclusion is based on the circumstance that those
foreign spheres of consciousness are sufficiently attested
to as to exclude for me any doubt in their reality, on the
other hand, they are to me personally completely and utterly
inaccessible. Hence, one concludes, they must be objective,
i.e., one includes them in the object, the real world. Since,
one argues further, they are different from one another and
from one's own not in kind, but only in individuality, any-
thing that holds for them must also hold for one's own
consciousness.
It is this chain of false conclusions from which the main
antinomies arise, the amazement that the objective world-
picture is 'colorless, cold, and silent,' the vain search
for the point where 'spirit moves matter,' etc. (1956, Pp. 183-
184).
Oppenheimer (1956) in reference to epistemological impossibility
of objectifying the world refers to "...the subtle relation of
what is seen to how it is seen The inseparability of what we
are studying and the means that are used to study it, the organi
c
48
connection of the object with the observer (p. 134). And David
Bakan (1953)--experimental psychologist and part-time epistemologist
in a different field (i.e. learning theory) and from a different
theoretical perspective--reached essentially the same conclusions:
The "methodological" distinction between scientist and subject
prevents us from seeing that the psychological processes of
the experimenter are an integral part of the nature of the
experimental situation (Pp. 47-48)
.
The work of Robert Rosenthal (1967, 1969), Orne (1962), Sarason (1951),
McGuigan (1963), and Barber (1972) and others in the social psychology
of psychological research is contributing significantly to the
weight of experimental data substantiating the many qualitative
and quantitative ways in which the experimenter confounds his own
experimental design by serving as an unaccounted for source of
variance (Epstein, Suedfield & Silverstein, 1973*, Schutz, 1969).^
^After an extensive review of this problem in relation to
methods of organizational research, Louis Barnes (1967) reached
essentially the same conclusions:
Even though, as Bridgman says, the experimenter cannot get
away from himself, he can at least reformulate his role so
as to take into account the problem of his own involvement.
He must find ways to treat himself as a variable rather than
eulogize his role as a detached controller of other variables.
He also needs to explore further the possibilities for altering
environmental and subject variables beyond the limits of those
assumed by classical design requirements. In short, as
McGuigan (1963), Tooley and Pratt (1964), and Klintz, et al
.
(1965) suggest, it seems time to review and broaden our
notions of experimental design (Pp. 89-90).
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We rtfrei hei t , as a scientific given, has come under increasing
attack from all sides (Brooks, 1973). The logical and empirical
impossibility of a value-free science has been argued by Kohler (1933)
in psychology; the biologist Waddington (1941); the physicist
Bronowski (1956); and Herrick (1949), the famous neurologist;
as well as a large number of sociologists including Myrdal (1944),
Horowitz (1963), Mills (1959), Gouldner (1964), Mannheim (1936)
and Lynd (1939) Some psychologists have been notably vocal in
acknowledging the inescapable presence of values, choices and
Typical of the steaming argument on the topic boiling between
sociologists over the years was an exchange in 1937 between E.E.
Eubank and H. W. Odum in articles by each entitled "Errors of
Sociology":
Let us, at the risk of seeming dogmatism, dismiss in a few
words this first and most grievous error which still haunts
the writings of the pseudo-sociologists Sociology
itsel f. . .passes no moral judgment and sets up no ethical
standards for human conduct. It neither approves nor
condemns specific policies nor programs of action as such,
but simply describes, analyzes, and declares relationships
of cause and effect, and leaves the question of what ought
to be, to be settled in specific instances by those who
are dealing with the moralistic and evaluative aspect of
particular social problems (Eubank, 1937, p. 180).
Odum, then editor of Social Forces which published the exchange,
retorted with his antithesis:
Another premise of error appears in the failure of sociology
to include social values as one of its major areas of study
and research This conclusion. . .is reflected in the extra-
ordinary deficiency in social standards and objectives which
the sociologists can make available for both theory and programs
of social planning at the present time
Judging from the current literature it appears that we have progressed
little beyond the situation Odum described in 1937. See in particular
the following texts: Bierstedt (1959), Goode and Hatt (1952),
Gouldner (1970), Lundberg, Schrag and Larsen (1958).
50
valuations in scientific inquiry and professional practice (e.g.
Korner, 1956; Lowe, 1959; Newbury, 1958; Van Kaam, 1958; Winthrop,
1959). 12 The comments of Brewster Smith (1954) summarize their views:
...The psychologist cannot stop making choices, as scientist,
teacher, therapist, or human engineer. The choices may be
witting or unwitting, responsible or irresponsible, but they
are made and they entail consequences .. .the claim to a value-
free science. . .only obscures the value elements in the choice
of the problem, of research setting, of conceptual framework,
in the decision to rest with negative findings, when results
are reportable, and so on endlessly. Only if we know what
we are choosing, only if the values involved in our choices
are explicit, do our decisions become responsible ones (p. 515).
Also recognizing the imperative need to make implicit values,
assumptions, and valuations explicit, Gunner Myrdal (1944) in his
profound metatheoretica 1 coda to The American Dilemma asserted:
Valuations are present in our problems even if we pretent to
expel them. The attempt to eradicate biases by trying to
keep out the valuations themselves is a hopeless and mis-
directed venture There is no other device for excluding
biases i n the social sciences than to face the valuations and
to introduce them as expl ici tly stated
,
specific
,
and
sufficiently concretized value premi ses (Pp. 1943-1944).
As Myrdal implies, scientists for years have frantically but
unsuccessfully attempted to achieve "absolute" objectivity and
eliminate "personal bias" by eradicating wherever possible all
sources of experimenter influence. Historically this method of
2
In the past ten years there has been an accelerating growth
of an interest group focusing on the role of human values in
psychology known as "The Third Force" or "Humanistic Psychology"
(cf: Bugental , 1965, 1967; Maslow, 1958; May, 1967; Pratt &
Tooley, 1968).
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controlling bias through the abortive effort to extirpate all sources
of experimenter influence originated largely with Francis Bacon.
According lo Karl Popper (1963), Bacon was the creator and the new
secular science's leading acolyte in propounding what Nietsche
once facetiously referred to as the "dogma of immaculate perception."
In Popper's words Bacon's scientific dogma demanded:
We must purge our minds of all prejudices, of all pre-
conceived ideas, of all theories, superstitions, or "idols,"
which religion, philosophy, education, or tradition may
have imparted to us.— If our minds are pure, we shall
be able to read the Book of Nature without distorting it:
we have only to open our eyes, to observe things patiently,
and to write down our observations carefully, without
distorting them--and the nature or essence of the thing
observed will reveal itself to us (p. 962).
Skipping a hundred years or so, in the latter part of the 18th
century, the beginning of a long series of negative cases for the
"dogma of immaculate perception" commenced when the astronomer
Maskelyne unhappily found that the observations of one of his
assistants consistently differed from his own. Assuming an
objectified, observable universe, Maskelyne summarily canned the
hapless assistant. In a few more years another astronomer, Bessel,
found that individual differences within and between astronomers'
observations were commonplace (Heidbreder, 1933). Thus in one
historic event, the "psychology of individual differences" and the
"personal equation" were born, and a precursory death knell for
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the doctrines of radical objectivation and absolute observability
sounded. Since that time scientists, striving for an impossible
type of objectivity, have made every conceivable attempt to "include
the observer out" of the observed system (Bakan, 1962; Stevens, 1936;
Wundt, 1904) but he always keeps slipping in the backdoor, even
in 20th century quantum mechanics. 13 As Werner Heisenberg (1958)
indicates:
In quantum theory, man as the object of science is brought
in through the questions which we put to nature in the a^
priori terms of human science (p. 106).
Thus, we come full circle: disenchantment, criticism and solid
evidence to the contrary abound, yet the classic model of "scientific
objectivity" persists like a Jungian archetype. If the Zeitgeist—
that is, the Scientific Establishment— is prepared, it is surely time
for open competition between alternative paradigms. Several years
ago my Kansas colleague, Gardner Murphy (1958), said: "Most
limitations of individual and cultural inventiveness lie in assumptions
13as you might expect, existentialists have long recognized
this phenomenon. As Sartre cryptically put it in Saint Genet :
"Action, whatever it be, modifies that which is in the name of
that which is not yet."
More recently a handful of behavioral ly oriented psychologists
and philosophers have begun to construct a phenomenological
explanation of reinforcement contingency valence and attributed
reinforcement potential and their role in the experimental
contract (Tooley, 1974).
53
if you challenge the assumptions, there is a new dimension (p. 250 )."
Having challenged the underlying assumptions of classical "scientific
objectivity, let us now explore the possibility of a new dimension.
Axiological Specification : A New Paradigm
This alternate paradigm represents a radical departure from the
epistemological assumptions (i.e. observability, objectification,
Wertfreihei
t
) underpinning the classic concept of "scientific
objectivity." In particular it calls for a reconceptualization
of the stereotyped outside-looking-in, detached role of the
observer. From this new point of view, every observer is a
parti ci pant-observer and therefore constitutes another source
of variance to be accounted for along with other sources within
the transactional system. In certain experimental systems--depending
upon the purposes of the particular study--it might be desirable
to minimize the investigator's participation (influence) in the
system by programming his participation in a highly structured
fashion. In other partici pant -observer situations particularly
those involving prescriptive operations (e.g. psychotherapy,
social design, education, change induction, action research, etc.)
the purpose might be to influence the system under investigation
as much as possible, but still accounting for (though now
exploiting) the variance within the system attributable to the
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change-agent 1 s participant-observation. The question becomes
then, not how to eliminate the "bias" (unaccounted-for-variance)
of participant-observation, but how to optimally exploit and
account for the relevant variables in terms of the purposes of the
research (Pratt & Tooley, 1967d; Tooley & Pratt, 1964).
From the ultimate standpoint of axiological specification,
authentic scientific objectivity is defined as the extent to which
every source of variance wi thin a^ qi ven transactional system i
s
accounted for- - specifi cal 1y including the investigator as ,a
contributing participant . As Rosenthal (1964) has pointed out,
whether or not we can pin down all the sources of variance in
a complex transactional system may be a philosophical question,
but it is an empirical question for scientists to account for
increasing proportions of variance in research due to experimenter
variables (Epstein, Suedfeld & Silverstein, 1973). Yet with the
rapid development of real-time science (Sackman, 1967), it may
well be what were philosophical problems a few years ago, may
turn out to be empirical, experimental problems in the future.
Inherent in this definition is the assumption that authentic
objectivity is a measurement of a_ representation of real i ty along
many dimensions. Put in a slightly different way, it is an
assessment of the adequacy of a given model (implicit or explicit)
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in reflecting all the sources of variance within a real system--
including reflexively the participant-observer or the model-maker
himself. 14 The assessment of this "goodness-of-fi t" between
representation of reality (the model) and the real system can
proceed along both quanti tati ve and qual i tati ve dimensions. 1 ^
Quantitatively the assessment can proceed from the gathering
of unorganized, or uncollocated data to highly sophisticated (and
expensive) computer-based, real-time systems. Such a taxonomy 1 6
of these levels could be categorized in this manner:
Uncollocated Data : This basic level involves the collection
of unorganized data--data which has been collected randomly
or "as available" and not been placed in the taxonomic
categories of a theoretical construction. This level was
essentially the "ideal type" that Frances Bacon strived
for in scientific data collection (Popper, 1963). While
14This is a classic problem in reflexivity; elsewhere it has
treated at some length in relation to Godel's theorem. Readers
interested in such metatheoretical quandries are referred to:
"Who watches the brainwatchers?" (Tooley & Pratt, 1964), and
"Action Psychology" (Pratt & Tooley, 1967d).
15Not to mention political lines— a discussion beyond the purpose
of this chapter but, needless to say of critical importance.
.
Those interested should read Scheff's (1968) article: "Negotiating
reality."
^Or, more accurately, a meta taxonomy. Special acknowledgement
is due to Dr. Walter Sedelow, Professor of Sociology at the
University of Kansas who first started my concerned thought
about the differentiation between these levels of information
gathering and utilization.
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oversold and misused, it may well yet come into its own,
however, as increasingly sophisticated "pattern recogition"
computer programs are developed.
Taxonomic Data : This level perhaps represents the first
level of rationally designed theoretical construction. It
can range from a simple binary, nominal system to differentiate
information from two classes of events to the elaborate,
highly comprehensive taxonomies, found in zoology and botany.
Until the rise of so-called "dynamic" psychiatry in the early
1920's in this country, psychiatry was fixated at this
level and was known as "descriptive" psychiatry J?
Systems Structure Analysis : This typically involves the
identification of all the subsystems within the target
system and the isolation of the component elements, relation-
ships and transactions within and between the subsystems.
This type of analysis usually generates its own taxonomy
within which data is to be ordered. Social Systems Accounting
is on the Grenze here; some of its procedures such as the
identification of social indicators falls into this category,
but other procedures such as measuring changes in system
structure over time overlaps with the following category,
System Performance Analysis (Tooley, 1971c). Gross (1966)
has indicated this is due to the nature of most complex
systems: structure and performance are usually so intricately
connected in fact, that separating them rationally for
analytic purposes is done with some cost.
Systems Performance Analysis : In general follows one of
two basic forms: (1) input-output analysis, and (2) assessment
of system performance in terms of progress toward the stated
objectives of the system (Tyler's Model). Specific techniques
include cost-benefit analysis, modeling and simulation,
linear programming, gaming, and much of operations research
(Churchman, 1972).
^"Descriptive psychiatry ," n once an illustrious school associated
with such famous figures as Krapelin and Bleuler, is now a
Schimpftwort in most psychiatric circles.
LEVEL OF QUANTIFICATION INFORMATIONAL FUNCTION
Uncoil ocated Data
Taxonomic Data
Systems Structural Analysis
1) Subsystem component identification
2) Social systems accounting
Systems Performance Analysis
1) Input/Output analysis
2) Tyler's model
Systems Variance Analysis
1) Multivariate statistical procedures
2) Real-time data processing
Level of Quantification and Corresponding Informational Function
Figure 1
System
Description
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Systems Variance Analysis : The goal here is to not only
isolate the subsystems and components, but to systematically
track down the sources of variance accounted for by each.
In the past, this level of accounting was limited largely
to bivariate, "independent-dependent" variable designs,
and consequently applied for the most part to very small
systems involving what Warren Weaver (1948) called "problems
of simplicity." Now with rapidly developing multivariate
techniques (e.g. factor analysis, analysis of covariance,
cluster analysis, etc.) and the computational machinery
to perform complex intercorrelations with large matrices,
huge strides are being made on problems of "organized
complexity"--problems typically involving 20 to 250 inter-
dependent variables (Struening, 1974).
Furthermore, the development of "real time" science threatens
to further revolutionize what is generally accepted as "scientific
method" in both the "bivariate" and "correlational" forms (Cronbach,
1957); as Sackman (1967) hints:
I believe we have been going about our scientific business
in reverse with respect to events in time. Science should
be built around real time events as they occur in object
systems, rather than force events to fit into temporally
invariant scientific molds. We should consider trading
in at least some of our platonic models for more down-
to-earth real time models (p. 224).
Thus by focusing on various qualitative characteristics of the
transactional field, combined with the possible levels of quantitative
analysis, a wide range of "objectivities" are available. Ends-
means criteria for the selected type of objectivity can then be
specified in terms of the purposes and methodologies of the agent:
e.g. description prediction, or control; social design; change-
induction; program evaluation. The key point here is the specifica-
tion of all criteria—whether implicit or explicit.
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In the case of the prescriptive disciplines, the quantitative
levels of accounting most frequently employed are Systems Structural
Analysis and Systems Performance Analysis. In the problems
encountered at this level of scientific activity it is mostly
impossible to achieve the level of control inherent in Systems
Variance Ana1ysis--nor is it necessarily desirable (Popper, 1963).
At the level of professional-scientific practice encountered in
systems analysis and design; psychotherapy and behavioral
engineering; as well as education, perhaps the most important
type of objectivity available is expressed in the principle of
axiological specification which states that:
Every scientist-professional i s responsible for identi fyi nq
and expl i ci tly speci fyi nq the axiological assumptions which
underpin hi s scientific-professional deci si ons and actions
and wherever possible accounting for their possi bl e effects
upon the outcome of his activity .
At the quantitative level of Systems Variance Analysis this would
require incorporating the axiological assumptions of the investigator
into the design as specific experimental variables. At the operational
or prescriptive level of practice, it means the public statement
(parti cul arly to the client) of whatever axiological assumptions
of the practitioner which may effect his professional activity.
18
1 81 n other places it has been indicated how the ethical base
for this type of professional practice (e.g. psychotherapy,
behavior modification, surgery, etc.) must be essentially
contractual and explicit in nature (London, 1969; Pratt &
Tooley, 1966a, 1966b)
.
60
For example, if a Catholic physician decides not_ to prescribe an
oral contraceptive on moral grounds rather than medical, that
deci s i on and the axi ol ogi cal base of that decision should be made
explicit to his patient so that she may guide her future actions
accordingly. Daily in the practice of psychotherapy, behavior
modification, and systems design, analogous axiological decisions
are made--wi ttingly or unwittingly--with consequences for human
values and life which frequently extend beyond the immediate situation
(London, 1969). By better informing all participants about the
basis of decision and possible future consequences, axiological
specification would thus serve as an important social control
among those individuals and interest groups whose prescriptive
decisions determine "what should be" (Cattell, 1973).
Beyond the immediate purpose of establishing a workable
axiological base for the prescriptive sciences, an additional
heuristic advantage of axiological specification is the encouragement
of novel assumptions. By specifying our basic assumptions it bares
postulational inadequacies and affords the opportunity to break
free from the traditional frames of reference conditioned and
reinforced by disciplinary molds and the scientific establishment.
It is commonly believed that scientific revolutions occur by so-
called "breakthroughs" or empirical discovery. As the history
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of science and the logic of discovery show, however, new systems
of thought and genuine revolutions are more often born of novel
assumptions. The historical works of Kuhn (1962), L. K. Frank
(1957) and Boring (1929) dramatically indicate that many if not
significant advances in science occur with radical shifts from
basic assumptions (Kuhn, 1974). Non-eucl i dean geometry was born
when Lobachevsky questioned Euclid's basic assumptions. The
heliocentric system developed when Copernicus departed from the
Ptolemaic system and the pioneering work of Einstein proceeded
with a radical departure from Newton's basic assumptions. The
history of science is replete with similar "Copernican revolutions"
all occurring with the invention of novel sets of assumptions
or paradigms .
The following issues, then, were raised and discussed in this
chapter:
The role of scientific inquiry in social change-agentry
.
The particular importance of values in the so-called
prescriptive sciences and disciplines.
The logical and historical inadequacy of the Machian
model of scientific objectivity.
The nature and process of axiological specification as an
alternative concept.
The importance of new paradigms in advancing science
and civilization.
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CHAPTER IV
HUMAN SYSTEMS ACTUALIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MEDICAL MODEL
Along with traditional values of freedom, equality, respect
for human dignity, and democratic participation; the value of
human excellence in American social and political philosophy
has been reiterated and enlarged by Gardner in his works, Self-
Renewal: The Individual and the Innovative Society (1964) and
Excellence : Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too ? (1961). This basic
human value was politically reaffirmed through federal legislation
giving birth to the Office of Economic Opportunity and related
legislation including those acts concerning Civil Rights, the
establishment of Comprehensive Community Mental Health Centers
and various urban renewal projects in the 1960's. These
legislative acts were primarily attempts to mitigate a number
of deactual i zing consequences of the existing societal contract,
but not to fundamentally modify that contract (Miller & Rein, 1965;
Moynihan, 1969; Pratt & Tooley, 1966a). The espoused legislative
intent was to: (1) politically, socially and economically re-
enfranchise the rights and obligations of those citizens handicapped
by the societal contract which denied (and continues to do so)
large segments of the population access to the opportunities
available in a democratic and affluent but inflationary society
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(Cahn, 1961; Galbraith, 1958; Harrington, 1962; Potter, 1954)
and, (2) develop broad intervention programs directed toward
establishing and maintaining levels of human functioning among
those segments of the population (including individuals, families
and communities) who "have not" achieved the minimal standards
of the American society (Cantril, 1965; Inkeles, 1965; Pratt &
Tooley, 1966a; Rae-Grant, Gladwin & Bower, 1966; Tooley, Zimmerman
& Pratt, 1966). The resulting programs, their derivative strategies
of intervention, and the social institutions developed to achieve
these goals, were plagued by such hangups as:
1. Frequently of questionable effectiveness
2. Have been assigned inadequate priorities
3. Are often off-target
4. Inappropriately conceptualized and taxonomized
5. Occasionally exacerbate the very conditions they
were ostensibly designed to ameliorate
6. Generate unanticipated, second order problems in the
process (Andreas, 1963; Pilisuk, 1974; Rossi &
Williams, 1972; Tooley, 1972b).
Nevertheless, the programs were important manifestations of
the fact that at least segments of the American public and its
government recognized that certain sociopsychological problems and
the deactual izing conditions that maintain them constitute major
hangups in actualizing the entire society and furthering social
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progress along the utopian continuum.^
This recognition of the pressing need for human systems actualiza-
tion at all levels of organization has important political implications
for the social-behavioral sciences (Tooley, 1972b). The public,
political recognition of these problems as legitimate and pressing
social concerns constitutes a new mandate for members of the social-
behavioral sciences: the evocation
,
maintenance and generalization
of effective human functioning (Korten, Cook & Lacey, 1970).
This mandate has been publicly acknowledged by a number of leading
professional spokesmen:
It is my estimate that society is caught up in a gigantic
tide of rising expectations and that this cultural phenomena
is not limited to the underdeveloped countries or to the
civil rights movement. Indeed it is a pervasive imperative
that has found expression in many of the elements of the
"Great Society." I think it no accident--not sheer
political design--that these rising expectations were
articulated by two of our foremost political leaders of
recent times and that they focus upon programs devoted
in their essence to effective human functioning in both
a broad and narrow sense (Brayfield, 1965, p. 647).
The character of a science and a profession is determined
largely, I surmise, by great ideas from within the profession
itself, generated by researchers and scholars, and by
great social movements generated outside the science and
profession entirely. For example, the direction of
development of the physical sciences in America today
is being profoundly influenced by the decision to put man
on the moon. The direction of development of the social
and behavioral sciences in America today will be profoundly
lit appears, however, at the present time that the actualization
of human systems and society is not a priority at the societal
level and many human service professionals are "waiting out the
current administration (Leopold, 1973; Tooley, 1971a, 1974).
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influenced by a national decision of comparable scope:
to make it possible for every citizen to develop his
potential to the fullest. This decision, this momentous
commitment to human development, will be the major
determinant of the character of psychology in the next
decade or so, provided that we are a responsive and
responsible profession prepared to pick up socially
significant options (Hobbs, 1966, Pp. 1-2). 2
Competence as a_ Model of Human Functioni nq
It is no coincidence that a growing number of social and
behavioral scientists are shifting from psychopathological
,
medical
and other person-blame-causal
-attribution models, to models of
competence, effectiveness and human actualization (Albee, 1973;
Caplan & Nelson, 1973; Leopold, 1973; Tooley, 1971a, 1974). In
addition to longtime advocates such as Phillips and Ziegler
(1961), Foote and Cottrell (1954), Gardner Murphy (1958), and
Brewster Smith (1965, 1973), Hunt (1967, 1974) and Peterson (1968).
The influence of the social-political-professional Zeitgeist
plus increasing experimental evidence substantiating the relevance
and utility of the model are proving to be substantial determinants
of many psychologists' professional and scientific behavior. Let
us examine a small part of the accumulating data which supports
the competence model
.
2This optimism of the sixties was rapidly turned to
disenchantment in the seventies (Moynihan, 1969; Tooley, 1971a,
1974). See for example Pilisuk's (1974) new book. How We Lost
the War on Poverty ; also Horowitz's latest. The Use and Abuse
of Social Science (1974).
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Robert White (1959) makes the concept of competence central
to his theory of motivation, personality development and human
actualization-underactualization. According to White, the pleasant
reinforcing experience of efficacy
,
of successfully dealing with
the environment and effecting consequences, begins in early infancy
and establishes an intrinsic motivation foundation which is relatively
independent of external reinforcement. 3 Effective action and its
consequences in terms of environmental mastery are essential to
the adequate development of all humans. Conversely, the development
of ineffective patterns of environmental transactions is characteristic
of many forms of psychosocial disorder including so-called
"schizophrenic" behavior. Analyzing the contingent relationships
between competence, human actions and their consequences. White
(1965) points out that:
It is clear that interpersonal competence, just like
competence in dealing with inanimate objects, is built
up through actions and their consequences. We learn
through experiences what effects we can have on others
and what effects they are likely to have on us In
such ways occurs the growth of interpersonal competence,
3White's emphasis on the role of effective action and play in
human behavior is highly similar to the formulations of Woodworth
(1958) who, after more than a half century ofresearch with humans
and lower organisms, concluded that efficacy in exploring and
dealing with the environment are primary motives. Similarly
Premack's (1965) research has reflected the reinforcing properties
of the opportunity to explore and manipulate the environment.
All of which was insightfully observed and more elegantly phrased
over seven centuries ago by the poet, Dante: "...every doer, in so
far as he does, takes delight in doing; since everything that is
desires its own being, and since in action the being of the doer
is somehow intensified, delight necessarily follows.... (Arendt, 1958,
p. 175).
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and it is always a question of actions put forth, of
attempts to exert an influence, and of discovering the
consequences of those attempts (p. 201).
From a seemingly radically different approach to human behavior,
Skinner (1938, 1953, 1959, 1971) reached strikingly similar
conclusions arguing that the relationships between contingencies,
consequences and effective behavior are central to the analysis
of human behavior and social systems:
Men act upon the world, and change it, and are changed in
turn by consequences of their action. Certain processes,
which the human organism shares with other species, alter
behavior so that it achieves a safer and more useful
interchange with a particular environment. When
appropriate behavior has been established its consequences
work through similar processes to keep it in force. If
by chance the environment changes, old forms of behavior
disappear, while new consequences build new forms (Skinner,
1966, p. 161).
In 1966, Lefcourt completed a review of related research
concerning the "internal versus external control of rei nforcement.
"
This personality construct, based largely on Rotter's (1954,
1966) social learning theory, refers to the degree to which
individuals see themselves as being responsible for, and in
control of their own behavior and at the other end of the continuum,
the degree to which they perceived (attribute) their behavior as
being the result of external control imposed upon them (Tooley,
1966a, 1974). Like White and Skinner, as well as Adler (Ansbacher &
Ansbacher, 1956) and Mowrer (Mowrer & Viek, 1948) before them,
this theoretical position stresses the instrumental and motivational
aspect of effective behavior, control and particularly the
question
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of the contingencies between behavioral acts and their consequences—
even more emphasized by a colleague, Fred Finch (1974).
The effects of early infancy and childhood experience upon
levels of competence has been an underexplored field of research
but is receiving increased attention (Bowlby, 1966; Frank, 1966).
The early work of Moore (1963) in teaching toddlers to read,
write and type through autotelic activities, Suzuki (1966) in
developing high levels of musical competence (Pronko, 1967)
and Asher's (1964) unique strategy of the "total physical
response" for developing precocious levels of linguistic abilities,
all indicate the long over-looked learning potential of pre-
school children. Even at the neonate level the human capacity
to learn is being demonstrated as in the research of Watson
(1967) who has shown how infants in the first weeks of life
learn to operate on their environment and acquire what he terms
"contingency awareness." Other research at this level by
Held (1966) demonstrates ways in which the development of visual
attention and grasping responses of infants can be greatly
enhanced by enriching and increasing the stimulation available
in the infant's transactional-field.
In 1965 a special committee of the Social Science Research
Council (Smith, 1965) on socialization and social structure convened
to discuss research and social action possibilities aimed at the
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broad-range development of human effectiveness from the neonatal
level through the evocation of competence in developing countries—
including the U.S. From the outset of the conferences it was
apparent that two, seemingly disparate, approaches were advocated.
The first approach, exemplified by the previously discussed work
of White, emphasizes the agent-role of the individual's own
effective actions and subsequent "intrinsic" satisfactions one
derives from dealing effectively with environment. This idiographic
strategy sees external reinforcement as a "stultifying" influence
which leads to undue dependency upon external incentives in
the social system.
An alternate strategy attacks the problem at a higher level
of organization—that of the would-be socializers and the social
systems within which behavior develops. Inkele's (1965) position
is typical of this theoretical orientation. From Inkele's point
of view competence must be defined socially. His model of social
competence involves the achievement of three sets of "statuses":
(1) basic minimal statuses which society expects or assigns to
individuals, (2) statuses to which one may aspire within the
contingencies afforded by the given social system, and (3) those
statuses which one may create or invent for oneself (Smith, 1965).
4
4fhe concept of status refers to a social position to which
adheres specified prerogati ves ; as is the concept of role, status
is invariably defined through personal, organizational, or
social contract-systems.
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Brewster Smith (1965) has attempted to reconcile these
divergent approaches:
The conception of competence with which each works is hewn
to fit his own divergent theoretical purposes. Yet
discussion showed that there is no essential clash
between the two points of view. The problem, rather,
is how to make them meet: how to formulate and under-
stand the interplay between processes of the kind
described by White in the social contexts and
with which Inkeles is concerned. There would seem
to be no "right end" from which to attack this
problem (p. 18).
The apparent conflict between these two different approaches
is reflected in Smith's use of the term interplay
. The two orientations
can be reconciled by viewing the problem from the transactional -
field and levels-of-organization perspective as discussed in
earlier chapters (Caplan & Nelson, 1973). From this point of view,
effective behavior is seen not only as a function of the "intrinsic"
characteristics of either the individual or the social system, but
also of the reciprocally modifying contractual transactions which
occur between them. The same transactional relationship obtains
at the opposite end of the effectiveness continuum--the realm of
psychosocial inability or disorder (Hunt, 1974; Tooley, 1971b).
In short, the functional and structural inadequacies of a society
and its constituent levels of social systems contribute to
dysfunctional or ineffective individual behavior, which in turn con-
tributes to the further dysfunction and disorganization of tne constituent
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social systems and ultimately, society.
5
Contract Systems_ Theory of Human Systems Actualization : In the
history of the modern western world the societal contracts of most
countries establish minimal standards of human effectiveness
demanding that the individual (1) become sufficiently autonomous
to prevent undue dependence of "drain" upon the social system and
(2) "adjust" and accommodate passively to the expectancies and
demands (stresses) of the social system (Cantril, 1965). Reflecting
the spirit of this minimal concept of human effectiveness, J.L.
Moreno once commented that, "if a man can get along on the outside
he is mentally healthy." While this minimal adjustment model
may still be more or less modal for most of the world, it
would appear that the Zeitgeist is ready to tolerate a more
ambitious conception of human functioning.
6
The contract system theory of human systems actualization is
based upon the optimal development of every individual and each
social system's capacity to engage the personal problems and
social issues of the times and through creative struggle
,
to
^Works explicitly concerned with doing justice to the complexities
of the transactional interplay between the individual and his
social systems include: Personality and Social System s (Smelser &
Smelser, 1963), Toward a General Theory of Action (Persons &
Shils, 1951), Society and Personality (Shibutani, 1961), Sanford's
(1967) Self and Society , Peterson's 0968) text in the field of
clinical psychology and more recently Spiegal's book, Transactions .
6ln the 1973-74 lecture series on human services, as a part of
the Mental Health and Human Systems Design and Administration Program,
virtually all distinguished lecturers called for broader, more
relevant models than the medical model (Albee, 1973; Bell, 1974;
Davis, 1973; Leopold, 1973; Rutledge, 1973; Spellman, 1974).
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expand existing degrees-of-freedom for choice and action. The
human systems actualization model emphasizes the concepts of
"constructive conflict" (Churchman, 1964; Murphy, 1958; Toynbee,
1957) and dialectical "reconciliation" (Jourard & Overlade, 1966)
as well as cooperation; 7 reliance upon individual and group self-
control rather than external social controls; excellence rather
than mediocrity (Gardner, 1961); coping and proactive behavior as
well as reactive behavior (Allport, 1960; Bonner, 1965); change and
innovation rather than maintenance of the status quo (Torrance,
1965); responsibi lity for conduct and consequences (Mowrer, 1967;
Skinner, 1971); and the development of value systems and competencies
which are personally and socially creative and are neither self-
defeating nor destructive of the values or well-being of others
(Aschenbrenner, 1972; Dubos, 1970; Pratt & Tooley, 1966a).
7This emphasis is to distinguish our conception of human systems
actualization from the narrower "bootstrap" concept of "self-
actualization" as adduced by organismic-holistic psychologists
(such as Goldstein (1940), Maslow (1962), and Rogers (1951)
who reflect an auto-actional epistemology with the Rousseauean
bias that man is intrinsical ly good and that if environmental
factors keep out of the way the "inner potentialities of man,"
present from birth, will unfold like a blossoming flower. Our
use of the term actualization reflects a situational-capability
model (analogous to Wallace's (1966) response-capability notion)
emphasizing the constructive uses of conflict and the transactional
relationship between personal capabilities and social system
contingencies both present and potential. The contractual -field
approach is unfettered by auto-actional epistemologies and "angels-
dancing-on-pinheads" assumptions about the intrinsic "goodness"
or "badness" of man. It is congruent with Gardner Murphy's (1958)
work on emergent human potentialities, and compatible with the
aims and theories of the so-called "third force" or "humanistic
psychology" movement as represented by May (1967), Bugental (1965,
1967), Severin (1965) and Allport (1960).
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It is immediately necessary to clarify the distinction and
relationships between our use of the term "actualization" and
related concepts of "effectiveness" and "efficiency." The referents
of the two latter terms are criteria for evaluating relative value
of certain means, along two different axis. "Efficiency" refers to
the differential costs of available means to achieve a given end,
and typically employs cost criteria such as time, money, pain,
manpower, or energy expenditure. "Effectiveness," on the other
hand, is an evaluation of means along a different dimension,
namely the "goodness of fit" between the outcomes of selected
means and stated goals. Thus a given means can be highly efficient
but totally ineffective and, conversely, an effective means might
be quite inefficient. Judgments of both efficiency and effectiveness
are essentially praxiological (Kotarbinski , 1965) in nature. That
is, they are concerned with choices between available means; and
they characteristically do not involved the explicit choice and
evaluation of ends which is an axiological matter (Hartman, 1967;
Urban, 1958). 8 This distinction between praxiological criteria
—
The necessary distinction and relationship between axiological
and praxiological problems often go unacknowledged by professional
purveyors of efficiency and effectiveness. See, for example, a
criticism of those social -behavioral scientists who accept as
unquestioned givens the ends (values, objectives, goals) of the
academic, industrial -mil itary complex they serve; and then proceed
to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of client organizations
under ci rcumstances that may result in extensive deactual izing
consequences for others (Praff & Tooley, 1968). In The Servants
of Power: A History of the Use of Social Science in American Industry ,
Baritz (1960) has provided a penetrating account of this phenomenon.
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of "efficiency" and "effectiveness" and axiological criteria of
actualization" is essential, for human beings and human organiza-
tions can develop and utilize highly effective and efficient
courses of action which result in devastatingly deactual i zing
consequences (Wallace, 1974).
In contrast to praxiological criteria of "effectiveness"
and efficiency" which are means-oriented, our use of the concept
of human actualization emphasizes the axiology of praxiological
actions in that it denotes irreducible ends-means configurations.
Furthermore these are ends-means directed at the open-ended
realization of the positive potentialities of all human systems
at all levels-of-organization; and finally, the "categorical
imperatives," of reciprocity
,
equi ty and mutual i ty are stipulated
as definitive criteria for actualization (Adams, 1965; Gouldner,
1960; Homans, 1961).
The dimension of reciprocity involves the evaluation of both
ends and means according to the degree that the consequences of
certain actions and values (means and ends) either benefit and
enhance life and living for all concerned or serve to inhibit,
constrain or even destroy the contractual rights of affected
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parties. 9 Gouldner (1967) has called this axis the "norm of
reciprocity.
"
Specifically, I suggest that a norm of reciprocity, in its
universal form, makes two interrelated, minimal demands:
(1) people should help those who have helped them, and
(2) people should not injure those who have helped them.
Generically, the norm of reciprocity may be conceived
of as a dimension to be found in all value systems and,
in particular, as one among a number of "Principal
Components" universally present in moral codes (p. 277).
In his book, Insight and Responsibility
, Erikson's (1964)
concluding chapter is "The Golden Rule in the Light of New
Insight" in which he contrasts patterns of reciprocally actualizing
relationships (between individuals and social groups) with
counteractual i zi ng or deactual izing relationships from the
individual to the international level. Then, like Gouldner,
he traces out, historically and transcul tural ly , the entire
reciprocity-mutuality continuum from the minimal demands of a
basic reciprocity
,
through individual, family and group social
9The failure by social scientists to attend to the reciprocal
nature of human behavior and human problems has been forcefully
addressed by Caplan and Nelson (1973) in their important article
"On Being Useful: The Nature and Consequence of Psychological
Research on Social Problems". Such failure leads to misconceptualiza-
tion and frequently off-target intervention (Pratt & Tooley, 1966b)
with devasting human consequences:
Why does one kind of poverty concern us, and another does
not? Why do we constantly study the poor rather than the
nonpoor in order to understand the origins of poverty? Why
do we study nonachievement among minority group members as
undesirable behavior, but do not study exaggerated profit
motive among "successful" businessmen as a form of deviance?
Why do we study the use of marijuana as a "drug problem,"
but not federal government involvement in the drugging of
"minimal brain dysfunction" (MBD) children in our grammar
schools? Why is it illegal to be a "wetback" but not to
hire one? (Caplan & Nelson, 1973, p. 207).
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patterns of cooperation (economic, political, cultural) to the
highest levels of creative mutual i ty involving "unconditional"
personal, interpersonal
,
and social commitment.
Erikson uses the concept of reciprocity-mutuality in establishing
an ethical Wei tanschauung for his theory of social development for
individuals and societies. His formulation of this concept at
different contractual levels (involving a variety of contract-
system spheres) is clearly illustrated in three passages:
I would advocate a general orientation which has its center
in whatever activity or activities gives man the feeling,
as William James, put it, of being "most deeply and
intensely active and alive." In this, so James promises,
each one will find his "real me"; but, I would now add,
he will also acquire the experience that truly worthwhile
acts enhance a^ mutual i ty between the doer and the other--
a^ mutuality which strengthens the doer even as it ~
strengthens the other . Thus, the "doer" and "the other"
are partners in one deed. Seen in the light of human
development, this means that the doer is activiated in
whatever strength is appropriate to his age , stage , and
condi tion
,
even as he activated in the other the strength
appropriate to his age, stage, and condition. Understood
this way, the Rule would say that it is best to do to
another what will strengthen you even as it will strengthen
him that is, what will develop his best potentials even as
it develops your own (p.233). Thus each growing individual's
developing strength "dovetails" with the strengths of an
increasing number of persons arranged about him in the
formalized orders of family, school, community and
society. But orders and rules are kept alive only by
those "virtues" of which Shakespeare say (in what appears
to me to be his passionate version of the Rule) that they,
"shining upon others heat them and they retort that
heat again to the first giver" (p. 232). Insofar as a
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nation thinks of itself as a collective individual, then
it may well learn to visualize its task as that of main-’taming mutuality in international relations. For the
only alternative to armed competition seems to be the
effort to activate i_n the historical partner what will
strengthen him i
n
h is hi stori cal devel opment even as it
s trengthens the actor i n hi s own devel opmen t-
-toward a~~
common future i d e n t i ty . Only thus can we find a common
denominator in the rapid change of technology and history
and transcend the dangerous imagery of victory and defeat,
of subjugation and exploitation which is the heritage of
a fragmented past (p. 242).
The contract systems theory of human systems actualization
holds that individual behaviors as well as the collective actions
of groups, organizations and societies must be evaluated along
these dimensions of reciprocity and mutuality. It is not enough
that actions be efficient and effective, for the social consequences
of misguided efficiency and effectiveness are potentially devastating--
as the history of man eloquently testifies (Smith, 1974) JO
The Gestapo, for example, was not only highly efficient, but
deadly effective in implementing the genocidal goals of fascism;
^Deactual izing possibilities include models of effectiveness
not evaluated along the axiological dimension of actualization
thus lending themselves to the "happy robot" process of "adjusting,
"fitting" or more euphemistically, "integrating" individuals into
organizations and societies without questioning the values of
the particular organizational or societal contract (Argyris, 1964).
In Brayfields' (1965) otherwise excellent plea for excellence,
consider the implications of his statement: "The crux of the matter
is the need to specify the common task requirements for effective
functioning as a member of a complex society" (p. 647). Also
Brayfield's quote from Talcott Parson's (1957) definition of
"mental health" raises dystopian spectres of happy robots or
even "good Nazis": "...the roles and tasks for which he has
been socialized" (p. 176).
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the dystopian axiology which fostered this warped organizational
contract, however, was so destructive that the "best" members of
the Gestapo (by praxiological criteria of efficiency and effective-
ness) became the most deactualized and dehumanized (Dubos, 1968;
Rutherford, 1973). Thus to the degree that "effective" individual
behaviors, collective actions and other equivalent manifestations
of value (e.g. policies, regulations, ideologies, laws, etc.)
are contingent upon the infringement of other people's rights,
they cannot be considered to be authentically actualizing
(Erikson, 1964; Gouldner, 1967; Shostrom, 1967).
By the same token, when contractual transactions serve to
mutually benefit all parties involved to that degree can the trans-
action be described as actualizing. Such outcomes of social process
involving high degrees of mutual benefit have been conceptualized
by Ruth Benedict as "social synergy" (Maslow, 1965).^ Thus,
highly synergic cultures are those which hold value systems which
lead to contractual exchanges of high degrees of mutual benefit,
or in game theory terms, these cultures display a preponderance
of non-sum-zero transactions over sum-zero games.
llMaslow (1965b) opens discussion with Ruth Benedict's statement:
I shall speak of cultures with low synergy where the social
structure provides for acts which are mutually opposed
and counteractive, and cultures with high synergy where it
provides for acts that are mutually reinforcing I
spoke of societies with high social synergy where their
institutions insure mutual advantage from their under-
takings, and societies with low social synergy where the
advantage of one individual becomes a victory over another,
and the majority who are not victorious must shift as they
can (p. 5).
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Out of the history of the personal-social-societal contracts
of man, three milestones have appeared in recent times: the United
Nations' "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (Schwelb, 1964)
and encyclical, Pacem in Terris
,
of Pope John XXIII (1963) and this
year, the Humanist Manifesto I and II (1974). It is interesting
that they come out of the fields of international law, theology,
and humanistic philosophy which (unlike the social-behavioral
sciences and psychology in particular) 12 have held to models that
have never divested man of his essential capacity to assume
responsible contractual relationships, his potential capacity to
choose and to assume both responsibility and accountability. All
three of these unprecedented documents establish taxonomies
of reciprocal human rights and responsibilities that emphasize
the contractual relationships within and between social systems
at all levels from individual to international. As does the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Pacem in Terris deals
with the contractual nature of "rights and duties necessarily
linked in the one person":
For example, the right of every man to life is correlative
^"...many think that the relationships between men and States
can be governed by the same laws as the forces and irrational
elements of the universe, whereas the laws governing them are
of quite a different kind and are to be sought elsewhere, namely,
in the nature of man.... (John XXIII, 1963, p. 6)."
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with the duty to preserve it; his right to a decent manner
of living with the duty of living it becomingly; and his
right to investigate the truth freely, with the duty of
seeking it and of possessing it ever more completely and
profoundly (p. 14).
In elaborating contractual relationships as the links which
"bind men together" in all of their "mutual dealings" the attainment
of a wide variety of actualizing "freely contracted" social contracts
is advocated:
...it is most necessary that a wide variety of societies
or intermediate bodies be established, equal to the task
of accomplishing what the individual cannot by himself
efficiently achieve. These societies or intermediate bodies
are to be regarded as an indispensable means in safe-
guarding the dignity and liberty of the human person,
without harm to his sense of responsibility (p. 12).
There is an immense task incumbent on all men of good
will, namely, the task of restoring the relations of
the human family in truth, in justice, in love and in
freedom: The relations between individual human beings;
between citizens and their respective political communites;
between political communities themselves; between
individuals, families, intermediate associations and
political communities on the one hand, and the world
community on the other (p. 56).
Utopias or Dystopias and Destruction . This brings us, full circle,
to a reconsideration of the place of utopias in human affairs
generally, and in the social and behavioral sciences more specifically
(Kateb, 1974). Bluntly put, it appears to many astute observers
that mankind's present level of ci vi 1 ization--manifested in the
international contract system--is not sufficient to prevent the
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annihilation of the human species and guarantee man a place
in the sun (Henshaw, 1971; Mills, 1959). Never before in
the history of the world has concentrated technological
and political decision power existed sufficient to effectively
eliminate whole civilizations in a matter of minutes.
To continue existence we cannot be content with prevailing
social arrangements and models of man;^ we must rapidly advance
beyond our present level of civilization and develop more utopian
civilizations, or what Boulding (1964) has termed "post-civilizations.
13()ne of the most serious philosophical and psychological
problems of our age may be to provide a view of man and his
surroundings that recognizes the validity of situational
causality without leaving the individual feeling helpless
and unable to shape his fate. Part of that view will have
to contain a more complex and sophisticated view of causality
than the implicit constant-sum model that most people seem
to hold (i.e., the more my environment is responsible for my
outcomes, the less responsible I am, and vice versa). But
until that state is reached, social scientists, especially
those concerned with environmental determinants of behavior
and thought, have a responsibility: we must recognize that
much of our work holds the potential for further eroding an
already changing social order and crumbling value system; and,
therefore, it may be argued that we have an obligation to
put something better in the place of that which we help
destroy. It is in this spirit that Miller (1969) suggested
that perhaps the most radical activity that psychology can
undertake is to build a new image of man, more valid and
hopeful than those of the past, and to freely dispense that
image to anyone who will listen (Caplan & Nelson, 1973, p. 209).
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As John Kennedy remarked--a long time ago—from the unique
perspective that the office of the Presidency of the United
States affords "Either mankind must eliminate war, or war will
eliminate man."
The utopian option, as an alternative to the destructive
consequences of dystopian societies, necessitates the discovery
and invention of social arrangements which provide (1) better
guarantees of life with (2) increasingly actualizing conditions.
This then, is the basic task of human systems actualization: the
development of descriptive, normative, and methodological taxonomies
with which to identify, bring into existence, and evaluate those
conditions (social, political, economic and psychological) that
might facilitate the realization of human potential at all levels
of organization. This is the empirical business of down-to-
earth serious Utopians (Toffler, 1970).
An important empirical step toward defining some of those
social-political conditions essential to the development of more
realistic utopias has been taken by the social psychologist,
Hadley Cantril (1965). In his book. Patterns of Human Concerns ,
which describes a monumental cross-cultural effort, Cantril summarizes
his work with an empirically derived, descriptive taxonomy of
eleven human needs which people everywhere are increasingly demanding
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of their societies. These requirements, which he calls collectively
the "human design," range from satisfaction of basic survival
needs, to the freedom of exercising personal choice, and the
opportunity to develop human capacities to the fullest. He
concludes that to remain viable a society must minimally meet
human requirements for survival and beyond this level, an effective
society is one that:
...enables the individual to develop personal loyalties and
aspirations which overlap with and are cogenial to social
values and loyalties, and which at the same time take full
account of the wide range of individual differences that
exist.
Such a social organization must, too, become the repository
of values, must provide symbols for the people's aspirations,
must comprise and contain customs, institutions, laws,
economic arrangements and political forms which enable an
individual in various ways to give concrete reference to
his values in his day-to-day behavior (p. 321).
To Cantril's definition of an effective society we would specify
additional requirements to qualify as an actualizing or utopian
society. To function at an actualizing level, a society (or any
social system for that matter) must explicitly recognize and provide
an expanding taxonomy of inalienable human rights and their corres-
ponding obligations. By "inalienable rights" we mean those social-
political conditions which bring about the progressive realization
of human capacities at all levels and the "inalienable obligations
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reciprocally linked to inalienable rights are those corresponding
tasks needed to maintain the social system. Both rights and
obligations at all levels are considered "inalienable" for to
the extent that either are not met to that degree is the actualizi
function of the system vitiated.
Cantril's taxonomy of human requirements is of particular
importance for it represents perhaps the first attempt by a social
scientist to empirically establish those human needs which might
qualify as inalienable rights and delineate the corresponding
contractual social order required to meet them. That the
failure of a society to meet its obligations to guarantee those
inalienable conditions essential for human actualization can be
internally catastrophic is appreciated by Cantril:
If the gap between what his society actually provides in
terms of effective mechanisms for living and what it
purports to provide becomes too great, the vacuum
created will sooner or later engender the frustrations
that urge people on to seek new social patterns and new
symbols (p. 321).
Thus to the extent that a given society does not meet its
obligations in providing its citizens those conditions necessary
for their actualization, or on the other hand, the constituent
individuals, groups and organizations fail to carry out the
obligated tasks essential to the maintenance of the society, the
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society can be considered dystopian and subject to progressive
decline or to the violent consequences which historically have
marked and changed such contracts. Awareness of the inequitable
discrepancies between "what is" and "what could or should be" in
societal contractual arrangements as a preeminent source of tension
and unrest often leading to civil conflict and violence is slowly
beginning to be recognized by social scientists (Adams, 1965;
Feierabend & Feierabend, 1966; Feierabend, Feierabend & Sleet, 1967;
Orbel 1 , 1967; Schwartz, 1967). Politicians and revolutionaries
throughout history, however, have long appreciated this fundamental
political fact— including Ex-President Sukarno of Indonesia who,
recognizing the relevance of awareness of gross discrepancies
between access to opportunities, power and the "goodies" of life
(basic needs and luxuries) to national revolutions, once commented:
The motion picture industry has provided a window on the world,
and the colonized nations have looked through that window
and have seen the things of which they have been deprived.
It is perhaps not generally realized that a refrigerator
can be a revolutionary symbol--to a people who have no
refrigerators. A motor car owned by a worker in one
country can be a symbol of revolt to a people deprived
of even the necessities of life. .. (Hollywood) helped to
build up the sense of derivation of man's birthright, and
that sense of deprivation has played a large part in the
national revolutions of postwar Asia (McLuhan & Fiore,
1967, p. 131).
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Exercising the utopian option, this chapter proposes a theory
of human systems actualization which is underpinned with the
optimistic faith that mankind can and must reflexively improve
itself through scientific, political, economic and social action
before it reflexively destroys itself (Etzioni, 1968; Kahn &
Wiener, 1967). With Buckminster Fuller, I agree that ultimately
mankind must choose between oblivion and utopia and urge social
and behavioral scientists to heed the apocalyptic admonishment of
Kenneth Boulding (1964): "The social system you save may be your
own.
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CHAPTER V
CONTRACT SYSTEM LEVELS
From the contract systems perspective, models are developed
for the delineation of human systems at all levels, at their
actualization and at hitches in actualization (Graves, 1970).
These ends-means hitches are often conceptualized as psychosocial
problems, e.g. political, sociological, economic, or psychological
disorders (Eron, 1966). The contract system approach to actualization,
or to hang-ups, requires analysis not only at the level of
organization at which the problems are most discernible, but also
at relevant levels above and below (Kuhn, 1974). This implies
that members of those disciplines concerned with the scientific
study and resolution of these problems, not only function as
specialists, but also retain (or in many cases acquire) the
capacity to function as generalists in order to keep in perspective
and appropriately weigh the higher and lower level determinants
which create or contribute to, and maintain target problems
(Gardner, 1964; Pratt & Tooley, 1965; Tooley, 1969). It is not
a question of whether or not we would like to look beyond the
traditionally constricted confines of our arbitrarily defined
specialties, but that we must, or miss the point entirely (Mills,
1960; Smith, 1974).
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The very nature and scope of the substantive problems faced by
the social-behavioral sciences discredit the artificial barriers
or definitions set up between the social sciences (Morane, 1967).
We can no longer beg the question with the seemingly "objective"
and modest excuse that consideration of those parameters is out-
side our area of competence and thus to be left to "others" while
we proceed as vf such determinants can be ignored or accepted
as unquestionable givens. As Ackoff (1963) has chided "we must
stop acting as though nature were organized into disciplines in
the same way that universities are (p. 346)." Also acknowledging
the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of current psychosocial
problems C. Wright Mills (1959) has insisted:
...To state and to solve any one of the significant problems
of our period requires a selection of materials, conceptions,
and methods from more than any one of these several disciplines.
A social scientist need not master the field in order to
be familiar enough with its materials and perspectives to
use them in clarifying the problems that concern him.
It is in terms of such topical "problems" rather than
in accordance with academic boundaries, that specializa-
tion ought to occur (p. 142).
Not only is multilevel analysis essential to understand the
systems that we study, but more important, to change these systems
it is often mandatory to intervene from different levels of
organization as Sanford (1965) has indicated:
In order to induce change in personality it may sometimes
be necessary first to change the role structure in the
organization in which the individual lives or works. By
they same token, since we deal with a dynamic interaction
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between personality and social system, it may sometimes
be necessary to change certain personalities in order to
change the social system (Pp. 194-195).
Sanford also emphasizes the need for theoretical concepts which
bridge levels of organization such as the self-system level and
social systems levels. These necessary conceptual links, which
articulate the transactional relationships between individuals and
social systems within and between levels, are essentially contractual.
A variety of conceptual schema representing the organization
of human systems is available and useful according to different
purposes (Morane, 1967). Some are institutionalized social-
political schema (e.g. international, federal, state, county,
municipal, neighborhood); others are theoretical -empirical
formulations such as Marney and Smith's (1963) elegant taxonomy
of open systems, and Ruesch's (1966) multilevel formulation of
social processes. Other elaborate schema which order phenomena
from inorganic to superorganic levels of organization include
the various general systems theories 1 (Bertalanffy , 1950;
1 Mi 11 er (1963, 1965a, 1965b) describes the application of a
general systems theory to a wide range of research problems in
the fields of biology, mathematics, and the social-behavioral
sciences: "At the Mental Health Research Institute of the University
of Michigan some of us work within the general systems orientation
which regards all life as a part of the physical space-time continuum.
We consider this continuum to be organized into a heirarchy of
levels of systems, all of which have subsystems and are themselves
subsystems of larger organizations or supersystems. The smallest
living system, the cell, is composed of nonliving molecules. These
may be free-living or may be components of organs, which in turn
are organized into more complex individual systems. These may
band into face-to-face groups or larger social organizations
and societies (1963, Pp. 1-2).
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Feibleman, 1954; Gray et al
. , 1969; Novikoff, 1945) and more
recently, the culmination of Floyd Allport's (1967) ambitious
thirty-year effort to formulate problems of social organization
and disorganization which in his words:
...constitute the major forms of "enestruolysis," or
“pathology" of organic beings; and they all seem to
occur at all levels of organic or collective aggregates
from the germ cell to nations or world organizations.
And as such they are the targets of all the “therapies,"
medical, psychological, material and social that have
been devised by men (p. 23).
Boulding (1956) presents an equally comprehensive model in
“General Systems Theory--The Skeleton of a Science." This schema
is somewhat unique in that it differentiates levels of organization
in terms of their "predominant emergent characteristics":
(1) The static structure--a level of framework, the
anatomy of a system; for example, the structure
of the universe.
(2) The simple dynamic system--the level of clockworks,
pre-determi ned necessary motions.
(3) The cybernetic system--the level of the thermostat,
the system moves to maintain a given equilibrium
through a process of self regulation.
(4) The open system--level of self-maintaining systems,
moves toward and includes living organisms.
(5) The genetic-societal system--level of cell society,
characterized by a division of labor among cells.
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(6) Animal systems--level of mobility, evidence of goal-
directed behavior.
(7) Human systems--level of symbol interpretation and idea
communication.
(8) Social system— level of human organization.
(9) Transcendental systems--level of ultimates and absolutes
which exhibit systematic structure but are unknowable
in essence (p. 201 )
.
Levels of human systems organization can be construed as
interlocking contract systems. To gain purchase on a given
target problem at whatever level it appears, all levels must
be systematically considered in order to appropriately formulate
the problem and to empirically check out possible sources of
relevant variance (Morrell, 1973). An adequate model of human
(psychosocial) systems should accommodate the following contract
system level
s
,
however, one chooses to label them:
(1) Self-system or individual contract systems;
(2) Interpersonal , primary or small group contract systems;
(3) Organizational and institutional contract systems;
(4) Community contract systems and networks;
(5) National or sociocultural contract systems;
(6) International contract systems and the "world community's"
social contract.
These levels form a heirarchy of organizational complexity
ranging from individual contract systems (within the i nteri or
contract space) through international contractual arrangements.
Events at all of these levels potentially have repercussions
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at all other levels. In Ashby's (1960) terms these levels are composed
of "richly-joined environments": systems in which every variable
is functionally related to all other variables, such that a change
in one variable may effect (however minimally) the values of all
other systemic variables (Heider, 1967; Kagan, 1967; Kuhn, 1974).
2
Currently most scientific inquiry, including theoretical and inter-
ventive endeavors, focuses upon intral evel events to the exclusion
or neglect of other levels (Sarason, 1974). 3
2|_ike Weaver (1948), Churchman (1964) has grappled with these
problems of organized complexity. "The artistry of science lies in
its ability to recognize simultaneously that every event depends
upon virtually everything else and yet to be able to estimate what
occurred in a specific instance (p. 368)." From my point of view
the degree of connectedness of a system is a continuous property,
and human systems should be treated "as if" all variables were
functionally related until systematic analysis is conducted to
determine the degree and type of relationship between the variables
in the system. As in art, where much may be selectively eliminated
to reveal essentials, models and theories in science are employed
to defy the complexity of reality by systematically ignoring some
variables to better articulate other, more essential, characteristics
of a system--a deliberate, but often useful form of reductionism.
3Typical of social scientists' neglect of the transactional
relationships between levels-of-organization is the stance assumed
by Lippi tt
,
el al . in The Dynamics of Planned Change (1958)
:
"Throughout this book we shall focus our discussion upon four types
of dynamic systems--the individual personality, the face-to-face
group, the organization, and the community. There are, of course,
other strata of society at which organized problem-solving efforts
and change continually go on, such as the national and international
strata. But we have chosen to pay attention to these four types of
systems and to a comparison of the ways in which they receive pro-
fessional help. W£ have chosen to accept the impl i ci t assumption of
the cases which we have analyzed that to some degree systems of each
type can be regarded as " closed systems " and that therefore they can
be helped without paying attention to systems at the other levels
Temphasis added, p. 5)."
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CHAPTER VI
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACTS AND CONTINGENCY DISCREPANCY THEORY
The history of civi 1 i zations, which is the history of societal
contract systems, reflects a spiraling growth toward more complex
forms of social organizations (Seidenberg, 1951; Toynbee, 1957).
In contemporary society every individual is directly and indirectly
involved in organizational and institutional contracts. Modern
man, his social institutions and society can only exist through
sophisticated contractual organization (Hayakawa, 1967).
Through contractual cooperation (consensual or coercive), rules
of conduct and action are negotiated; and all parties to
organizational contracts are expected to meet their contractual
obligations in a reliable manner (Bronowski , 1956; Havighurst,
1961; Maine, 1861; Montague, 1950). The organizational
complexity of life for man today, in both its actualizing and
counteractual i zing aspects, is a societal fact (Mandelbaum,
1955). Confronted with this societal fact— that all individuals
(including psychologists) must participate in organizations
and, in turn, be affected by the consequences of their participa-
tion-psychologists have no choice but to study these higher
level contractual determinants of behavior. Sarason (1967)
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has recognized this necessity:
...as psychological theorists move in the direction of
stating comprehensive formulations about the determinants
of human behavior they will become increasingly concerned
with the nature of social organizations, the ways in
which they change, and the consequences of these changes.
This development will not be a matter of choice but
rather of necessity in that in reality the relation-
ship between the individual and the "organized settings"
is not a matter of choice. The problem for theory is
how to go beyond token gestures to these relationships,
how to study and understand the extent of variations
in these relationships, and how to begin to formulate
generalizations which do justice to the complexities
involved (p. 227).
As indicated in the previous chapter, organization contracts
are considered as affecting each other, and as being affected
by higher level societal contract-systems on the one hand,
and on the other by lower level small-group and self-system
contracts. Organizational contracts, in turn, transactional ly
affect both societal level and individual level contract systems
It becomes a matter for empirical investigation to determine
for any given problem at which level (s) the contractual
determinants or loadings are located. It needs to be re-
emphasized that there is not inherently an antithetical relation
ship between organization contracts and the individual as
pictured by Argyris (1964) just as there need not necessarily
be a counteractual izing assault between any system levels
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per se. (Bennis, 1974). Conceptualizing the individual-organization-
societal interfaces as absolute intrinsic antinomies is contractually
untenable: contract systems at all levels and between levels
may be actualizing or counteractualizing, adequate or inadequate,
synergistic or dysjunctive, prodigal or impoverished, but they
obtain. Inexorably, every man, woman and child, for better or
worse becomes involved (enmeshed or ennobled) in and through
organizational contract systems. People are positively
and negatively shaped by organizations. People are also shaped
by how they. in turn, are able to, or choose to, shape and us£
organization (Bennis, 1973). Organizations can be used, and
can be created, for actualizing or counteractualizing purposes.
To organize means to get together to carry out a purpose. The
purposes of an organization (over or covert) may be actualizing
or counteractualizing for all or some of the parties to the
organizational contract.
The organization-as-a-system can best be conceptualized as
being comprised of multiple sets of contractual exchange systems,
or contract-system reciprocity networks . Actualization of
component systems is frequently contingent upon the actualization
of other subsystems and of the total organization (Pratt &
Tooley, 1966b, 1968; Tooley, 1974).
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Organizations, groups within organizations and individual
members, may be actualized or underactualized to various degrees.
Organizations themselves may be actualizing or counteractual i zi nq .
So-called "socializing institutions" all too often exacerbate
the very conditions they are ostensibly designed to ameliorate:
educational institutions (from graduate school to kindergarten)
turn out "trained-incapacity," prisons produce criminals,
schools for the blind make people "blind," rehabilitation
centers cripple, welfare agencies degrade, schools for the
retarded teach stupidity, while "mental hospitals" drive people
crazy or make crazy people crazier (Tooley & Pratt, 1970). The
documented literature condemning the iatrogenic institutions to
which people are condemned (largely because they are troublesome
to themselves or to others) has become voluminous. Such institutions
are counteractual i zing; they are "dehumanization machines"; they
have institutional ized human deactualization; they operationalize
the concepts of "inhuman," "evil," or "bad, "--they have made
"institutionalized" a bad word (Blatt, 1973; Bragisky, et al . 1969;
Henry, 1971; Wallace, 1974).
Just to give the flavor of a few current references: 1
Gross (1970) Radical School Reform ; Palmer (1970) "Crane
Vor the past decade, Steve Pratt and I (see bibliography) have
struggled with the problem of iatrogenic organizations, focusing
mainly on the mislabeled "mental health" field: "How Crazy Ideas
Lead to Crazy Practices in Hospitals, Clinics and Cities" (1968);
"Speaking in Tongues: The Public-Professional Contract" (1967);
"Innovations in Mental Hospital Concepts and Practice" ( 1 967 )
;
"Myths, Models, and the Mental Health Metaphor" (1963); "Psychic
Psoriasis: The Role of the Psychologist in the Prevention of Progress
(1963); "Why Has Care Lagged" (1962); "The Mental Hospital and the
Treatment Field" (1960).
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Organizations, groups within organizations and individual
members
,
may be actualized or underactualized to various degrees.
Organizations themselves may be actualizing or counteractual i zi nq .
So-called "socializing institutions" all too often exacerbate
the very conditions they are ostensibly designed to ameliorate:
educational institutions (from graduate school to kindergarten)
turn out "trained-incapacity," prisons produce criminals,
schools for the blind make people "blind," rehabilitation
centers cripple, welfare agencies degrade, schools for the retarded
teach stupidity, while "mental hospitals" drive people crazy or
make crazy people crazier (Tooley & Pratt, 1970). The documented
literature condemning the iatrogenic institutions to which people
are condemned (largely because they are troublesome to themselves
or to others) has become voluminous. Such institutions are counter-
actualizing; they are "dehumanization machines"; they have
institutionalized human deactualization; they operationalize
the concepts of "inhuman," "evil," or "bad,"— they have made
"insti tuionalized" a bad word (Blatt, 1973; Braginsky, et al . , 1969;
Henry, 1971; Wallace, 1974).
Just to give the flavor of a few current references:
1
Gross (1970 Radical School Reform ; Palmer (1970) "Crane
lFor the past decade, Steve Pratt and I (see bibliography) have
struggled with the problem of iatrogenic organizations, focusing
mainly on the mislabeled "mental health" field: "How Crazy Ideas
Lead to Crazy Practices in Hospitals, Clinics and Cities (1968);
"Speaking in Tongues: The Public-Professional Contract" (1967);
and "Innovations in Mental Hospital Concepts and Practice (1967).
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High: Factory for Futility— Fires, Fights, Chaos";
Scott (1969) The Making of Blind Men-. McDaniel (1969)
"Deaf Power Next?"; Chapman (1970) "The Changing Scene:
Revolution of the Handicapped?"; Dexter (1964) The Tyranny
of_ School i ng : An Inqui ry Into the Probl ems of Stupi di ty ;
Menninger (1968) The Crime of Punishment ; Harris (1969)
"Better Prisons or Better Crime?"; Kilpatrick (1969)
"Figures Belie Penal Rehabilitation"; Shevin (1970) "State
Jails Turning Out Better Crooks"; Jordan (1969) "Prisons
Called Public Vengeance, Crime Schools for Rejected Men";
Elman (1968) The Poorhouse State : The American Way of
Life on Public Assistance ; Phillips (1967) "The Iatrogenic
Environment: A Transactional Framework for Social Research";
Alinsky (1965) "The War on Poverty— Pol i tical Pornography"
:
Goffman (1961) Asylums : Essays on the Social Situation
of Mental Patients and Other Inmates ; Vail (1966) Dehumanization
and the Institutional Career ; Stewart (1965) "On Keeping
Mental Patients Chronic"; Christ and Wagner (1960) "Iatrogenic
Factors in Residential Treatment: The Psychiatric Team's
Contribution to Continued Psychopathology"; Lehrman (1961)
"Do Our Hospitals Help Make Acute Schizophrenia Chronic";
Mahrer (1963) "Psychological Symptoms as a Function of
Psychiatric Hospitalization"; Wing (1962) "Institutionalism
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in Mental Hospitals"; Szasz (1970) The Manufacture of
Madness ; Leifer (1969) In the Name of Mental Health;
Diamond (1967) "The Increase in Physical Disorders Among
Mental Hospital Patients"; Ewald's (1964) "Functions of
the State Mental Hospital as a Social Institution"; Talbot
and Miller (1966) "The Struggle to Create a Sane Society
in the Psychiatric Hospital"; Talbot, Miller and White
(1964) "Some Anti therapeutic Side Effects of Hospitaliza-
tion and Psychotherapy."
Paying attention to the fact that iatrogenic organizations
operationalize the notion of "evil" (operationally defined)
may rehabilitate the concept and make it scientifically
respectable (Becker, 1968). In "Toward a Sociology of Evil,"
Coser (1969) appropriately defines evil as constituting "hangups"
or "hitches" in exchanging more utopian (actualizing) social
arrangements for existing dystopian (counteractual izing)
contracts. Such hangups are not simply the result of technological
shortcomings but of conscious opposition, of active blocking
or obstruction of progress. Writing "On the Visibility of Evil"
Wolff (1969) ominously outlines alternate ways of responding to
increasingly obvious institutionalized evil--from intensified
denial of injustice, to rational ization of exploitation ("Sure
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those things are bad but after all let’s be realistic..."),
to open endorsement of inequity-all of these as against the
possibility of coping constructively with evil. Also consider
Evil iji Man . The Anatomy of Hate and Violence ( Bychows ki, 1968);
and Becker's (1968) Tte Structure of Evi
1
: An Essay Towards the
Unification of the Sciences of Man
.
History demonstrates that the range of the human capacity
for good and for evil (the inhumanity of people to people) is
indeed incredible (Pratt, 1970; Tooley & Zimmerman, 1973).
Communication theory solutions and the human relations approach
£ejl S£ are not enough. Structural discrepancies, inequities,
counteractual i zing contracts are not necessarily accidental
nor unavoidable or be alleviated by process methodologies
(Guttentag, 1966; Tooley, Zimmerman & Pratt, 1966). There
are social groups, organizations, and individuals who have real
(and/or perceived) vested-interests in maintaining
,
maximizing
,
and creating counteractualizing discrepancies . They are in a
position to play an exploitive, manipulative or coercive,
anti-synergistic, power-based sum-zero game. This is often to
their advantage or aggrandizement, in terms of money, power-
control and ego-enhancement. With some notable exceptions,
these interests are concentrated in the corporate-military-union-
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church-professional
-government-academic complex (Nader, 1972;
Reich, 1970). In testimony presented at the Federal Hearings
on Human Resources Development and Research, Brayfield (1968)
stated in part:
Our economic system aims to energize and organize the
productive capacities of a people to the end that they
will, through the mechanism of an exchange arrangement,
be provided with goods and services. In this economic
system the production of goods and services is the major
justification for the form which it takes. It is concerned
with the development of human resources only secondarily
and, in fact, mainly as they serve the ends of private
ownership, which is the distinguishing characteristic
of the system. Our economic system is readily geared
to the exploitation of human beings for personal
advantage and all too frequently caters to the basest
motives and the meanest talents; it does not have as
a prime goal the nurturance or development of social
motives or behavior or constructively useful talent
(p. 482).
Organizations can be described in the language of contractual
contingencies (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969; Schein, 1965). There
may be gross deficiencies in the development of organi zation-
system potentialities, or gross deficits in the general availability
of opportunity structures within the organization (Leavitt, 1962;
McGregor, 1960; Mizruchi, 1964). 2 Iatrogenic organization
contracts, of course, offer almost unlimited opportunities for
2 Forehand and Gilmer (1964) have summarized research relating
to three ways in which the organization contract ("organizational
climate") may affect behavior: (1) by defining the stimuli
which confront the individual, (2) by placing constraints upon
the freedom of choice of behavior, (3) and/or by rewarding
and punishing behavior (p. 369).
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the development of negative potentialities, for negative
opportunity structures, for counteractual izing, explitative, zero-
sum games, for counteractual izing operant behaviors, for counter-
actualizing reinforcement, for counteractualizing contingencies.
The objective, however, is to discover and invent positive
potentialities, to create actualizing opportunity structures—
to transform zero-sum into non-sum zero games as discussed
in the previous chapter.
Within the organization, at the individual or group level there
may be deficiencies in (1) behavioral repertoire e.g. in operant
behaviors or skills (competence), and in expressive behavior;
there may be deficits in (2) reinforcing events or reward
systems. Both discrepancies may be quantitative (in number
or numerical range) or qual i tati ve (in terms of adequacy or
quality of range). And there also may be (3) deficiencies
as between (contractual) behaviors and their appropriate
reinforcement contingencies (Skinner, 1966; Tharp & Wetzel,
1969). The latter type of deficiency can be thought of as being
analogous to the concept of "structural unemployment" in
economics. In "structural unemployment" there are large
numbers of persons (groups) and large numbers of certain jobs
but no contractual arrangement or opportunity structure that
puts the persons, with their behavioral skills, together with
the jobs— thus the paradox of unemployment in the face of a
"labor shortage" such as with teachers today. Or there may be
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people with obsolete skills, or simply without any marketable
skills. Ferster (1965) writing about behavior disorders,
competence and self-direction uses this illustration:
Thus, instead of altering his own behavior so as to
make it conform to the reinforcing practices of the
existing milieu, the individual alters the milieu;
for example, he moves to a new community so that it
can maintain his existing repertoire. Such would
be the case with an unemployed worker who moves to
a new city where employment relative to his skills
is available (p. 22).
Ferster indicates that there are several ways in which the person
can resolve the di screpancy between his behavioral repertoire
and the situational (or organizational) opportunity structure
(i.e., patterns of accessible contingencies of reinforcement).
Thus, instead of altering his behavior to conform to existing
milieu, he can alter the environment. He can "alter" the
milieu by moving from a bad situation to a good situation.
He can leave the present field for greener pastures--but what
if he can't leave or if greener pastures don't exist or are
not accessible." It should not be overlooked (because in some
situations this may be the most realistic or only solution)—
he may alter the present situation by changing it directly.
He can attempt to renegotiate his present organization contract,
either individually or through organized group effort. Thus,
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whether one likes it or not, direct action is taken by such
groups as Student Dissidents, Vietnam Protest, Slum Building
Squatters, Black Militants, "Womens' Lib" (e.g., N.O.W.),
and Unions.
All permutations of deficiencies may obtain within and between
contractual behavioral repertoires and contractual reinforcing
events or the existing reward structures (Ferster, 1965).
These permutational sets of deficiencies can all be categorized
as one form or another of counteractualizing contingencies--
contingency deficits or contingency conflicts (Deutsch, 1969;
Halpern, 1968).
Such discrepancies engender tension states3 which may be
reflected in withdrawal or apathy, in some form of accommodation,
in action for change, or even revolution as elaborated in
Chapter IV. Action for change itself can be, of course, either
counteractualizing (even catastrophic)--or actualizing as
3Perhaps Heraclitus was the first to hypothesize that all
social progress extends from tension (Goheen, 1970). It should
be noted that this concept of tension need not be associated
with motivational theories based on homeostatic need or tension
reduction models such as Maslow's.
It is interesting that Schlesinger (1969) from a psycho-
analytic perspective, adduces the "tension system" involved
in "making promises" (i.e. reflexive or interpersonal contractual
commitments) as central to his motivational system. Homme and
Tosti (1965) use "contingency contracting" as the key construct
for their behavioristical ly derived theory of motivation.
105
Moynihan (1969) and others have pointed out (Pilisuk, 1974;
Toffler, 1970). In the latter case, "discrepancy-produced-
tension can be construed as a motivational vector or dynamic,
for change from a less advantageous condition (dystopian)
to a more advantageous (more utopian) condition (Becker &
McCl intock, 1967; Cantril, 1965; Henshaw, 1971; Thomas, 1969).
The characteristic feature of man is action ( purposive
ends-means conduct ). Man aims at changing some of the
conditions of his environment in order to substitute
a state of affairs that suits him better for another
state that suits him less (von Mises, 1962, p. 34).
This tension generated by real, or even perceived discrepancies
can be referred to as the "discrepancy dynamic" or as the
"utopian-dystopian dynamic" (Tooley, 1974).
Adams (1965) has developed a research-based theory of
inequity that specifies both antecedents and consequences of
perceived injustice (inequity) including effects on cognitive
processes and behavior.
Finally, it may be noted, if it is not obvious, that
injustice (inequity) is a response to a discrepancy
between what is perceived to^ be and what is perceived
should be (p. 272) Men do not simply become
dissatisfied with conditions they perceive to be
unjust. They usually do something about them (p. 276).
...anger that realizes the void between the way things
should be
,
and the way things are (Moorman, 1969, p. 72)
.
Adams (1965) has critically reviewed the experimental
literature dealing with research in the area of inequity
in social exhange. It is immediately apparent that the construct
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of inequity is exactly what discrepancy theory is about. The
concepts of "equity-inequity," "distributive justice,"
"
relative deprivation," "reciprocity imbalance," "perceived
injustice (either reality-based or misperceived)
, "cognitive
dissonance," "social responsibility,"4 and "social justice"
(Leopold, 1973) can readily be related to the discrepancy
theory construct of discrepancy dynamic .
Social concern and the struggle to correct injustice, to
remedy inequity and oppression, to enlarge options and opportunities
are all connected with Adler's (1938) key concepts of Sorge und
II
Gemei nschaftsgefuhl (concern and social interest). Discrepancy-
derived tension resulting in social action can be conceptualized
as the struggle for power and freedom--what Adler called
Freiheitstrieb . Here I refer to degrees-of-freedom for choice
and action (contract alternatives, options) with power defined
as the capacity to effect outcomes (Champlin, 1974):
Thus our concern is with the shaping of behavior--wi th
the acquisition of skills and habits that individuals
can use to secure for themselves the social and other
4The theoretical and empirical groundings for each of these
constructs can be found in the work of Adams (1965), Adams and
Rosenbaum (1962), Argyris (1969), Berkowitz and Daniels (1963),
Blau (1964), Festinger (1957), Fouraker and Seigel (1963),
Gouldner (I960), Homans (1958, 1961), and Jacques (1961).
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rewards that sustain behavior. The acquisition of a
more adequate behavior repertoire opens alternative
avenues of action for the individual and promises the
possibility of choice--the essence of freedom (Brayfield,
1968, p. 480).
This then is the purpose of contract systems theory--the
actualization of human systems (Pratt & Tooley, 1964, 1967b,
1967c; Tooley, 1971a, 1972a, 1974).
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CHAPTER VII
PARTICIPATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACTS
"Organizations are grand strategies individuals create to
achieve objectives that require the efforts of many (Argyris,
1960, p. 24)." Participative organization would maximize the
effective power of the many (of all parties to the organization
contract) by having all take part in the formulation of goals,
in policy-formulation, in administration. All participants
become "generalist-specialists," all have both "line" and^
"staff" responsibilities.
Effects of participation have been studied extensively from
the early work of Lewin, Lippitt and White (1939) on styles
of leadership to such studies as those by Coch and French (1948)
on degrees of participation in planning; Morse and Reimer
(1956) on decentralization of authority; and Kidd and Christy
(1961) on relating type of supervisory approach ( laissez faire ,
direct participation, and active monitor) to productivity.
In their comprehensive work, "Environmental Variation in
Studies of Organizational Behavior," Forehand and Gilmer (1964)
conclude that:
...one of the few general hypotheses concerning organizational
variation that has been investigated with any degree of
thoroughness might be stated as follows: An organization
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in which personnel policies are participative, democratic,
unstructured, will differ from one whose practices are
nonparti cipative, authoritarian, or structured in that
productivity, and employee satisfaction will be higher.
There is evidence in support of this hypothesis, much
of it summarized by Likert (1961) (p. 368).
In Control In Organizations
, Tannenbaum (1969) concludes
that influence or control is not a fixed quality which must be
divided among the heirarchical levels of the organization but
that it can be thought of as a thing of which everyone can
have more (i.e. as with a non-zero sum game). Reviewing the
relevant research literature Tannenbaum finds that there is
considerable evidence presented that those organizations in
which all levels feel that they have more influence are also
more effective. It is of course important to ascertain whether
" feel that they have more influence" is reality-based or another
version of pseudo-participation. In other words do all levels
de facto have more influence and power or is this just another
manifestation of exploitative manipulation or tokenism (Bennis,
1966b; Gomberg, 1966; Gomberg & Marrow, 1966). There is
empirical evidence that it is not simply the feeling that one
is participating (so-called "psychological participation") but
rather it is actual participation, that is important (Tannenbaum
& Smith, 1964)
.
no
If the organization does not have clear goals and cannot
develop a sense of identity, there is nothing to be
committed to and nothing to communicate. At the same
time, no organization need have its goals and identity
imposed by its top executives. There is no reason
why the organization cannot develop its goals and identity
col laborati vely and participatively
,
engaging every
member down to the lowest echelons (Schein, 1965, p. 106).
Pugh (1966) summarizes the literature, from the early Hawthorne
studies to Likert's (1961) New Patterns of Management
,
and
concludes they "all add up to an impressive body of data"
demonstrating that "communication and participation in decision
making are among the most "significant rewards which can be
offered to obtain the commitment of the individual (p. 241)."
A review of communication studies indicates that a participative,
nonheirarchical organization contract (as opposed to heirarchical
,
authoritarian, nonparticipative contracts) provides a climate
more conducive to the production of new and innovative ideas
(Blau & Scott, 1962)
.
In Management by Participation (Marrow, Bowers & Seashore, 1967),
strategies-for-change which involved attempts at "power equalization"
throughout the organization (Harwood Manufacturing Company)
were empirically linked, positively, to specific outcome criteria:
cost-production criteria as well as attitude, job satisfaction,
initiative for problem-solving, etc. Of all the strategies for
organizational change, Leavitt (1964) concludes that "power
Ill
equalization" strategies are the most influential —
They share an emphasis upon pushing the power and
responsibility for decision making as far down in the
organizational heirarchy as possible, establishing
relationships of mutual trust and authenticity,
and keeping all channels of communication open.
They also share assumptions that employees, in
general, will be more satisfied and more productive
when working under such conditions (Forehand & Gilmer,
1964, p. 377).
Bureaucratic structure is rigidly heirarchical with the
directionality of power-authori ty moving down, from top to
bottom. Participative administration turns the power-pyramid
upside down. The development of the trend toward such a dispersion,
if not inversion, of the power-structure can be followed in
the literature: from "Pine" to "Oak" type organization contracts
(Etzioni, 1960, 1961; Henry, 1957), from bureaucratic "pyramidal"
to a "hexagonal" structure of levels-of-authority (Forehand &
Gilmer, 1964), from "Tall" (centralized) to "Flat" (decentralized)
(Porter & Lawler, 1965). All of these approaches call for
increased four-way influence and communication channels:
horizontal (back and forth) and vertical (up and down).
Compatable concepts include distributive leadership, delegated
and shared responsibility-authority-accountability (Tooley, 1971).
Argyris (1967) comments that Forrester, writing in Industrial
Management Review recommends that the organization of the future
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"eliminate superior-subordinate relationships and substitute
for them the individual self-discipline arising from self-
discipline arising from self-interest created by a competitive
market mechanism within the system. The individual would
negotiate continuously changing relationships (Pp. 21-22)."
Argyris sees the emergence of this prediction in the increasing
use of the Likert-type, Link-Pin Task Force within the "Project
Team matrix" organization contract. Burns and Stalker (1961)
introduced a continuum to which organization contracts could
be ordered on the dimension of flexibility-rigidity (in
reference to policy formulation, power-authority allocation,
decision-making, position-role configuration, etc.). Pilisuk
and Hayden (1965) on a grander scale developed a continuum
to which organizations or nations could be ordered on sets of
dimensions representing degrees-of-democracy versus lack of
options for democratic participation.
The trend toward increased representation , or participation
for all parties to the organization contract can also be traced
as a reaction against the rigid role constraints of the
bureaucratic-type of contract. ^ It is in this context that
^Classic, current and comprehensive critiques (advocates and
adversaries) of the bureaucratic organization contract are
plentiful; for a sample consider Bennis (1963) "Bureaucracy and
Social Change: An Anatomy of a Failure," Bennis (1970) American
_
Bureaucracy, Dubin (1949) "Decision-Making by Management in
Industrial Relations," Gouldner (1955) Patterns of Industrial
Bureaucracy and Merton (1940) Bureaucratic Structure and Personality .
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Brown (1960) called for the transformation of informal "upward"
communication systems into formal "Representative System."
As we have seen one could readily trace the thrust for increased
democratization of organization contracts through much of the
work of McGregor (1960), Lewin, Lippit and White (1939), Likert
(1961, 1967) Blake and Mouton (1964), Gouldner (1959), Bennis,
(1966a) Argyris (1964) and many others. It becomes explicit
in titles such as "Every Employee a Manager" (Myers, 1968)
or Management by Participation : Creating a^ Climate for Personal
and Organizational Development (Marrow, Bowers & Seashore, 1967).
This democratic trend culminates in the extreme position
that as a result of mounting pressure for increasingly equitable
organizational contracts, democracy is inevitable within organiza-
tions, and furthermore that democratized organizations ultimately
will result in a democratic society. "Warren Bennis and Michael
Crozier, among others, have written that the society of large
and complex organizations will make man free, will mean the
inevitability of democracy (Krager, 1970, p. 78)."
Organizational Contingencies
An organization can be construed as being comprised of a
network of interlocking sets of role relationships (Katz & Kahn,
1966). These are essentially contractual relationships involving
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the exchange of obligations (e.g. role-tasks) and benefits
(role-rewards) (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1959; Hodgson, Levinson &
Zaleznik, 1965; Parsons, 1951, 1957; Perucci
, 1966; Ruesch, 1966;
Schein, 1965). In the language of contingencies, this contractual
exchange involves sets of operant behaviors and reinforcing
events. Contingencies can be either actual i zi nq or counter-
actual izinq (Krasner, & Ullmann, 1965; Tharp & Wetzel, 1969;
Ullmann & Krasner, 1966).
With a general systems approach to organizational and individual
behavior, the concept of operants can be extended, beyond its
usual application to individual behavior, to the behavior of
groups or organizations (Baker, 1973). The language of contin-
gencies (operant and reinforcing contingencies) can be used,
and used operational ly, in connection with human systems, within
and between all level s-of-organization e.g. from intrapsychic as
with self-reinforcement, to person-group, to organizational,
to international exchange (Andreas, 1969; Homans, 1961).
The ends (ideals-goals-objectives) of a democratic organization
can never be achieved unless the means to those ends are placed
in the hands of all parties (constituents) to the organization
contract. These ends-means configurations are contractual and can
be expressed in the language of contingencies. The purpose of a
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participative organizational contract is to make it possible
for all parties to have formal (as well as informal) representation
(Pitkin, 1974). All parties must have access ; must have
representati on formalized and legitimized through ensystem -
atization, through being incorporated within the system. This
means access to wider ranges of contingencies: job-enhancement,
job-enlargement, "generalist-specialist" roles, "line" and
staff responsibilities.
It is interesting that Scott Myers and colleagues (1964, 1968)
working on their version of "job enrichment" (at Texas Instruments)
have researched and written extensively about what they call
the "therapeutic value" of participation in a more democratic
organization contract. They present a conceptual and operational
framework:
...to erase the management-labor dichotomy and give
substance to a slogan every employee a manager--a
manager being defined as one who manages a job. A
self-managed job is one which provides a realistic
opportunity for the incumbent to be responsible for
the total plan-do - control phases of his job Job
enrichment ( vertical and horizontal ) is an iterative
process Judged as they are year-to-year
,
in terms
of profit, cost reduction, cash flow, and return-on-
assets criteria, job enrichment is seen as a significant
resource for achieving success. But it offers even
greater rewards on a long-term basis, particularly if
criteria of success are broadened to include aspects
of human effectiveness, such as self-actualization of
employees, responsible civic and home relationships, and
the profitable and self-renewing growth of the organization...
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the implementation of job-enrichment principles in industry
has great potential for developing a pattern of responsible
behavior learned through a way of life at work which can
influence people's behavior in their multiple roles in
the community and family.
William Glasser's (1965) new approach to psychotherapy points
up the therapeutic value of enriched work. Rejecting
a classical concept of mental illness and style of therapy.
Dr. Glasser defines a process to help the individual face
reality and accept responsibility for satisfying his
needs in a way that does not deprive others of the ability
to fulfill their needs. He shows that opportunity to
love and be loved and to feel worthwhile to themselves
an others is essential for responsible behavior....
Enriched work offers such an opportunity for healthful
interpersonal relationships by enabling people to act
responsibly in the pursuit of meaningful goals. . .providing
conditions for the development of others and thereby
bringing about his own self-development (Meyers, 1968,
Pp. 18-20).
Thus as argued by Argyris (1962) in Interpersonal Competence and
Organizational Effectiveness
,
organization effectiveness and
personal actualization, again, are found to be reciprocal and
transactionally interdependent.
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CHAPTER VIII
FROM MENTAL HOSPITAL TO CENTER FOR HUMAN ACTUALIZATION
It must be remembered that there is nothing more
difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor
more dangerous to manage than the creation of a
new system, for the initiator has the enmity of all
who would profit by the preservation of the old
institution and merely luke warm defenders in those
whowould gain by the new ones (Machiavel 1 i , circa
1513 ).
The previous chapters have outlined a theoretical rationale for
human system design and management; the succeeding chapters will
illustrate their application to a large scale social experiment that
occurred during the period 1966-1969. In 1966, Dr. Steve Pratt
was appointed to be the first psychologist as superintendent or
director of a large state mental hospital
J
The hospital itself was founded in 1847 by Dorothea Dix
and was the first mental hospital in the State of Illinois.
Its history from its beginnings was typical of all such
IThis was the historic and— at that time--courageous act
of Dr. Harold Visotsky, then Director of the Illinois Mental
Health Department (Tooley, 1971a). At that time the imperialistic
grip of organized psychiatry was so strong that on the front
page of every issue of the Newsletter of the Association of
Medi cal Superintendents of Mental Hospi tal
s
a black-bordered
warning appeared proclaiming as top priority the prevention
of non-medical superintendents.
RESOLUTION
THE COUNCIL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENTS OF
MENTAL HOSPITALS UNANIMOUSLY AFFIRMS, AND THE MEMBERSHIP
RATIFIES, ITS POSITION OF DEPLORING THE RECURRING EPISODES
IN SEVERAL STATES, WHEREBY PHYSICIANS TRAINED IN PSYCHIATRY
ARE BEING SUPPLANTED BY NON-MEDICAL PERSONNEL AS THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF STATE MENTAL HOSPITALS.
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institutions and has been historically chronicled and sociologically
critiqued at length (Fisher, Mehr & Truckenbrod, 1973; Goffman,
1961; Pratt & Tooley, 1962a, 1967a). Any reader of Goffman's
(1961), Asylums
, would have instantly recognized the social
structure, organization and process that obtained in that
institution in 1966.
It basically was a human warehouse, but politically and
professionally it was known--as the term has it--as a
"custodial mental hospital." The ubiquitous staff-inmate
caste system was there; no one really expected to get out
(staff or inmates) and staff and community were in general
collusion to maintain that grim status quo.
The hospital was staffed and run largely by the nursing
service; the previous superintendent was a benign (?) physician
who had spent most of her latter years in retirement. Of the
1200 odd staff there a handful of foreign-trained^ physicians
and the psychologists and social workers were, with an
occasional exception, without Ph.D.'s or M.S.W. 's--again a
situation not atypical of large, isolated mental hospitals.
The organization of the institution was no stranger, either:
admission wards; so-called "continued treatment wards" (a
2 in most cases this could be translated as inadequately trained.
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euphemism at best); medical
-surgical wards; violent wards;
"discharge wards" (another misnomer) and even, of all things,
a tuberculosis ward.
We had spent some years in Kansas preparing for the task
and had a model to try out (Pratt & Tooley, 1964). We knew
where we wanted to go and at least some notion about how we
wanted to approach the enormous task of upending an incarcerati ve
mental hospital and transforming it into a "Center for Human
Actualization" or "Institute-for-Living. " As Muzekari (1970)
noted:
Pratt and Tooley (1964) present a model for the total
transformation of mental institutions into "Institutes-
for-Living" reflecting the trend toward effecting a
rational and congruent pattern of human and organizational
relationships both within the institutional complex
and between the institution and relevant community
resources. Previous emphasis on intraorgani zational
processes gives way to development of increased inter-
action and interdependence between the mental institu-
tion and the extramural community by relating the
institution to, and making it a part of, its
supporting environment (Pp. 79-80).
The goal was to transform an isolated medically-dominated
organization into a community-integrated Center for Human
Actualization organized along the contractual, learning theory
model explicated two years before (Pratt & Tooley, 1964).
Given that purpose, the existing constraints and resources,
what steps does one take and what strategies does one employ?
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Taking a cue from Chairman Mao that an understandable, widely
disseminated philosophy is essential to social change we began
the process by promulgating among staff, clients and community
a thirteen point philosophy to serve as a guide for policy
formulation, program development and "clinical" practice
(Tooley & Pratt, 1966b):
1. As long as we're alive there's room for improvement,
capacity to change; and all behavior, no matter
how disturbed or retarded, can be modified for the
better. Treatment-oriented evaluation emphasizes
an individual's assets, aptitudes and potentialities
rather than an exclusive preoccupation with
"psychopathology. " Concern is not with personality
disorder or behavior deficit per se
,
but only as
these difficulties tend to interfere with effective,
satisfying living.
2. Responsible and competent behavior is our objective.
To increase their capacity for responsible behavior,
people require opportunities to assume responsibilities
in all aspects of daily living; people need to learn
from their successes and from their mistakes; to
learn the positive consequences of responsible
behavior and the negative (self-defeating) consequences
of irresponsible behavior. An Insti tute-for-Living
can create social-systems which will elicit and
reward competent social behavior. This involves
learning new skills, roles and attitudes; learning
how to learn; and developing behaviors for coping
with change, hardship, frustration and success.
Meaningful success requires struggle, concerted
effort, humor and wisdom.
3. Every interpersonal transaction can provide an
opportunity for personal growth, learning or
problem-solving. Our Institute-for-Living, as
a community-oriented social-system, can provide
for a wide variety of such actualizing transactions.
This "treatment-field," patterned after realistic
community living, could approximate eight hours
of actualizing activity (e.g. meaningful work),
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eight hours of creative use of leisure, and
eight hours of restorative rest. Such an "8-8-8"
Program should function increasingly as a participant-
governed, "guided democracy." Again, the objectives
are increased responsibility, competence, a sense
of effectiveness; and an authentic sense of values,
of personal value, of being valued by others.
4. That people often help themselves most through
helping others, is known as the "therapeutic
principle of helping." This principle has far-
reaching implications for staff, clients, and
collaborating community citizens as we all become
co-therapists, co-researchers, co-change-agents.
5. As every interpersonal transaction can provide an
opportunity for personal growth, learning or
problem-solving, every member of the total staff
should become involved in, and expect to make
a significant contribution to, treatment and
training programs. This applies to every employee,
without exception, whether classified as clinical,
business, dietary, engineering, etc.; nonprofessional
or professional. Only in this way can each person
maximize his "therapeutic potential" and increase
his sense of personal participation in, and
identification with, his organization's goals.
6. Except for some acute or chronically ill patients
who require care and treatment within the Medical-
Surgical Complex, our residents should be regarded
(by themselves and others) as very active participants
in their own treatment programs. This is in
contrast with the passive-dependent-receptive
"sick role" traditionally prescribed for patients
in custodial ly-oriented mental hospitals.
7. The people (staff, clients and community citizens)
who are to take part in treatment programs (aimed
at developing responsibility) should increasingly
contribute toward the design, development,
implementing and evaluation of all such programs.
This kind of total staff-client-community partici-
pation restores the total task of the organization
to the proper parties who thus regain their power-
of-agency. People can become their own change-
agents and thus gain authentic competence through
collaboratively solving their problems.
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8. Every employee has both staff and line responsibility
and accountability. Democratic philosophy is reflected
in administrative policies that expect all staff,
client and community citizens to take part in program
development. This offers many opportunities but
at the same time places heavy demands on all
parties: these are the opportunities and demands
involved in distributive leadership-shared
responsibility and authority are always coupled
with shared accountability! As competence increases,
decision-making is shifted downward in the de-
centralized administrative hierarchy to the level
at which the decision is to be implemented. At
this point consequences can be directly connected
with actions; thus both positive and negative
feedback can be optimally exploited.
9. A three-dimensional -space communication-system
model should be developed. This could incorporate
a rapid-return four-directional pathway network:
reciprocal 2-way vertical (down-up), coupled with
reciprocal 2-way horizontal (between i.e. to-from)
networks
.
10. New social learning treatment concepts are developing
so rapidly that traditional professional training
institutions and universities are generally unable
to keep abreast of the times. Thus, to minimize
the obsolescence of trained-incapacity, we must
develop our own inservice Program-Integrated-
Training for Total Staff. Keeping in touch with
progress, internationally, our innovative training-
education-evaluation program must extend and renew
itself by continuously training new trainers.
The on-going objective is to involve all staff-
client-community citizens as co- teacher-1 earners.
11. As an " Insti tute-for-Li vi ng" we encompass a Medical-
Surgical Complex plus four on-campus regional
Comprehensive Mental Health Centers (CMHC's). Each
of these four Centers serves exclusively one of the
four subzones of our 18-county Zone. The total
staff of each Center constitutes a Team that works
in collaboration with clients and with all community
agencies within the counties it serves. Each Team
is responsible for developing a comprehensive range
of communi ty-i ntegrated services and for continually
improving these in the light of feedback and evaluation.
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12. As change-agents we have a contract for change
and exchange : Our contract-for-change is’ based on
the concept that any "final" solution to psycho-
social problems requires that target groups
increasingly become their own change-agents. We
need to continually develop this philosophy as
policy and apply it equally to: community,
institution, staff, and clients.
13. Our goal is the total transformation of a "total
institution"--from a custodial-orientation to a
client-centered, community-integrated "Center for
Human Actualization." A progressive staff and
clients' council collaborate with an enlightened
citizenry to effect an all-purpose program of
treatment, training, education, and social-
action-research (innovation and evaluation).
Given this philosophical statement we mapped a strategy
of four contractual steps for structural change that will
be described in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER IX
CREATING A CENTER FOR HUMAN ACTUALIZATION: FOUR CONTRACT STEPS
Step One : Pragmatic Cartesian Dualism
An immediate problem was to deal with the historic medical
model of conceptualizing human problems and the subsequent
medical organization of human services that characterized
not only that organization, but mental health organizations
nationally. 1 Our strategy was one of containment: pragmatically
to divide those human problems that were basically physical
from other behavioral, or psychosocial problems-in-1 i ving.
Organizationally this was expressed by establishing a
Medical-Surgical-Infirmaries complex that was to be our hospital
for those with diagnosed physical diseases and disabilities.
This dualism was to imply that the medical model was not to be
pre-empted or "done-in" but that it was quite appropriate for
certain purposes. At the same time new resources and new
status was officially accorded the Medical-Surgical-Infirmaries
complex and it became, in fact, what it should be—
a
"iHere, with other historical issues, the hard controversy
over the "medical model" in all of its protean forms is best
taken in the original (Fisher, Mehr & Truckenbrod, 1973;
Pratt, 1961; Pratt & Tooley, 1962b; Stuart, 1970; Szasz, 1961;
Tooley, 1971a; Ullmann & Krasner, 1965).
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, leaving the remaining organizational units to become
social treatment-oriented comprehensive community mental health
centers
.
Staff members who felt a strong commitment to a medical
model were given the opportunity to practice it to its legitimate
fullest--in the hospital. Other staff members who opted to
practice the broader social habilitation model had their
choice of the four Centers.
Step Two : Decentralization
The second major organizational change was the further
subdivision of the total Institution, that is, of everything
that remained after the M-S-I complex was separated out. The
Institution (minus M-S-I) was decentralized into four on-campus
"Comprehensive Mental Health Centers." This special semantics
(CMHC) was employed with a designing eye on Federal Staffing
Grant prospects which later paid off (half-a-million dollars).
The actual decentralization move, involving the entire resident
population (close to 2,000 at that time), was carried out with
full staff and resident participation and was successfully
completed in half a day on April 16, 1966.
^Interestingly enough, the upgrading of medical standards in
this complex enabled the organization to obtain full accreditation
by the American Hospital Association for the first time in
its 121 year history of medical direction.
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Each of the four Centers was completely free to develop any
and all kinds of programs (including high risk programs) as
long as it also provides a reasonable facsimile of the ten types
of programs (five basic, five desirable) required to qualify
for Federal designation as a "Comprehensive Community Mental
Health Center."
Federal requirements stipulate the following ten services
or programs (the first five comprise minimum requirements to
qualify, with the expectancy that the second five are soon
to follow--rationale for sequence remains obscure): (1) Residential,
in-client ("in-patient") service; (2) Out-client ("out-patient")
or campus-visitation service, we included "walk-in" service
or IPS i.e. Instant Psychological (or Psychiatric) Service
which was provided 24 hours a day, seven days a week; (3) "Partial
hospitalization" services, including "day program" and "night
program," "week-end" or "week-day" programs, etc.; (4) Emergency
service around-the-clock; (5) Community consultation and education
services available to community agencies and professional
personnel; (6) "Diagnostic services"; (7) Rehabilitation
services, including vocational and educational programs;
(8) Precare and Aftercare services; (9) Training and staff
development; and (10) Research and program evaluation.
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As a CMHC each semi
-autonomous Center served (but in
collaboration with other available community resources) its
own exclusive geographic catchment area comprised of three to
six counties. The advantages for and rationale for this
ecological strategy for programming have been elsewhere adduced
(Tooley, 1970).
The position of Director or Program Coordinator of each
Center was open to any person qualified by aptitude, experience
and ability (including physicians, psychologists, nurses,
business administrators or what have you). At one point the
chief of the largest Center (300 residents) was by civil
service classification a "Welfare Executive." Previously the
Head Nurse for thirty-five years, he was promoted and supervised
members of all disciplines including M.D.s (an unprecedented
reversal of medical pecking order). In many instances old
time custodial ly-oriented institutionalized staff became the
most progressive leaders. Often and against all predictions
the worst became the best— the most fully actualized. We called
this conversion phenomenon the "Beckett bit" where against all
odds the role makes the man, or better put, the man rises to
the role unexpectedly and completely. This dramatically demonstrates
the relationship between participative organization and the
constructs of competence and power-of-agency.
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Decentralization represented a renegotiated organizational
contract that better provided for participative organization
as between the Centers and the communities with whom they
were to jointly develop collaborative programs. The Centers
did not simply deliver services in the traditional sense
(though traditionally mental hospitals seldom delivered what
they were supposed to) but to be of assistance as needed and
requested by communities in local program development.
At that time Illinois Governor Ogilvie advocated an active
3-way " partnership 11 between Federal, State and Local agencies,
also a partnership between Department of Mental Health Facilities
and all other community resources, public and private. Ogilvie
emphasized that only through such working partnerships can
mental health programs be actualized throughout the State of
Illinois (Ogilvie, 1969). The former Department of Mental
Health, Dr. Visotsky, defined this system-for-exchange (e.g.
of services) between facilities and communities as an "implied
contract" (Visotsky, 1964). As the Centers developed working
partnerships with local community agencies throughout their
counties these informal contracts were converted into actual
formal written contracts which spelled out the proposed, agreed-
upon, exchange of services in terms of sets of reciprocal
obligations, rights and benefits. These partnerships developed
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into "contract-system reciprocity-networks" (Blackman & Goldstein,
1967; Pratt & Tooley, 1970a).
The pragmatic purpose of setting up the four CMHCs was to
create series of partnerships which provided for an open-ended,
planned and emergent, participative administration
. It also
makes it feasible to develop networks of potentially actualizing
community contracts.
Step Three : " Participative Administration "
In competition with all of the other Department of Mental Health
facilities in II 1 inois—some twenty-five including the mis-
labeled "mental hospitals," the new multi-million-dollar
Zone Center facilities (Reidy, 1964) and not-so-new institutions
for the mentally retarded— three Gerty Awards were awarded
(1968-1969) to Jacksonville State Hospital. These three state-
wide first place achievement awards were: (1) For "The most
outstanding treatment program": a large-scale Federally-funded,
on and off-campus Contractual Workshops System ; (2) For "The
most unique community collaboration program": the Communities-
with-Centers experiment submitted with the believe-it-or-not
title, " Horse Therapists on the Right Track/
1 (horses do make
fine therapists for humans and we built our own stables and
on-campus race track, the Circle TRT; and (3) the award for
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"the best state program in the category of administration
based not only on criteria for conceptualization but also on
being highly workable: Participative Administration " (Coogan,
1969; Pratt & Tschetter, 1969).
In April of 1967, Jacksonville State Hospital formally
initiated a new concept and method of administration known
as participative administration." Participative administration
simply means that everyone in the organization or who is
affected by it, should have a voice in running it. This was
our means to alleviate the age-old communication problem between
administration, staff, clients and the community.
This approach was in the democratic spirit of the Founding
Fathers of America. It was similar to the early New England
Township type of government in which every person in each
community had a voice in the affairs that concerned him and his
community. Each person contributed according to his special
abilities and was both responsible and accountable for doing
his part. While this approach had its roots in the democratic
tradition, it also represented the most current thinking at
that time in the fields of political science, business, industry,
community development, mental health, and education (Argyris,
1964; Bennis, 1966a; Maclver, 1969a; Marrow, Bowers & Seashore,
1967; Maslow, 1965b; McGregor, 1960; Myers, 1968). As shown
by the organizational chart there are three areas or levels of
administration. The base or lower area of the chart represented
Executive
Council
FIGURE
II
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the foundation of the organization. It was made up of all
the constituents or participants in the program.
The second level in the organization chart was the Administrative
forum or Administrative Council level. This consisted of the
foirr major Councils which, in effect, represented the administra-
tive power blocks of the community-integrated organization.
The four Councils were: (1) Centers Administrative Council;
(2) Clients Administrative Council; (3) Volunteer-Citizens
Administrative Council; and (4) Departmental Administrative
Council (which was an integrated joint "clinical" and "business"
services Council).
Centers Administrative Counci 1
Jacksonville State Hospital had four on-campus major treatment
Centers plus special Units, including the Medical-Surgical-
Infirmary complex (which was comparable to an accredited community
medical-surgical hospital) and an Out-of-Zone Unit housing
residents from outside our geographic catchment area. Each
Center had a distinctive identity of its own and had primary
responsibility, authority and accountability for the development
of its own programs. Each Center had direct representation
on the Centers Administrative Council. Here, plans for the
Center programs, on-campus and off-campus, were developed,
shared, coordinated and evaluated.
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Clients Administrative Council
Resident-clients, and cl ients-in-the-community, and patients
(those hospitalized in the M-S-I complex for physical illness)
were all represented on the Clients Administrative Council.
Resident government organized on the ward level culminated
in this top level administrative body. All wards on each
Center had their own resident government. It was interesting
that on some Centers resident-clients and staff in semantic
rebellion against the custodial connotation of the label "ward"
euphemistically renamed these areas as suites e.g. " Dogwood
Suite ," " Exodus Suite ," etc. The resident councils on each
Suite sent representatives to their overall Center Clients
Council, and each Center Clients Council in turn sent
representatives to the Institution-wide Clients Administrative
Council. The Clients Administrative Council had its own suite
of offices and conference rooms in the Arts-For - Living building.
This Council participated with the other three Administrative
Councils in problem-solving, policy construction and overall
program innovation, generalization and evaluation. Each resident
and client of the Institution could make his critical and
constructive ideas known through this Council. It represented
in practice the treatment theory that responsibil ity and
participation educate.
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Volunteer-Citizens Administrative Council
The function of this Council was to open the door to the
wider community. Years ago the campus was isolated on the
outskirts of town but the expanded town in time surrounded
the hospital. A low, rose and vine-covered garden fence circled
the 240 acre tree-covered campus. In the past this decorative
wrought-iron fence marked a clear line of demarcation between
the "Asylum for the Insane" and the world at large. The function
of this Council was to break down all attitudinal remnants
of that imaginary "iron curtain" and allow for fuller "partici-
pative organization" involving all citizens: staff, clients,
and volunteers from the communities. This allowed the
organization's philosophy to reach out into the larger community.
Conversely, the community had excellent ideas and human resources
to offer in the way of constructive criticism, creative
planning and collaborative action. This Council gave the
entire community an official voice in hospital affairs and
represented the individual citizen, private enterprise, business
and industry, labor unions, civic groups, and all colleges
and schools.
Departmental Administrative Council
Each and every department, both clinical and business, had
a voice or forum through the Departmental Administrative Council.
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This Council was designed to rapidly minimize and ultimately
eliminate the traditional clinical-operational dichotomy.
Setting clinical staff above or against business or operational
staff was divisive and counteractual izing. It reflects a
disjunctive class structure that precludes full participation
of all parties to the organizational contract. It mirrors
the traditional "staff-patient" caste system and the sterile
use of negative labels e.g. "clinical" versus "non-cl inical ,"
"
non- professional ."
At the Departmental Administrative Council programming
recommendations could be initiated, policies clarified, inter-
departmental problems could be solved, Center-versus-department
conflicts resolved, and enhanced roles for representatives
of the various disciplines could be developed. Also new
enlarged program-oriented staff-line responsibilities for
department heads were developed.
Many staff members had a dual and complementary allegiance
as members of specific disciplines or departments and at the
same time as Treatment Team members. The goal was for every
staff member to develop both "specialist" and "generalist
abilities, to become a new breed of "generalist-specialist";
and that every staff member to have the opportunity to take
on both line and staff responsibilities. The Departmental
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Administrative Council made a major contribution to the overall
development of on-campus and off-campus programs, action-
research and community activities.
The Inter-Council Contract
The four Administrative Councils maintained close communication
with one another and each made its unique contribution in
connection with all major policy, programming and evaluation
endeavors. Communication among the four Administrative Councils
was expedited as follows:
(1) Minutes were regularly exchanged among Chairmen of
each of the four Councils.
(2) Each Council could request reports or "position
papers" from the other Councils on any pertinent
subject in order to clarify given topics or
projects under discussion. Thus Councils functioned
like "resource persons" to each other.
(3) Each Council had the right (or obligation) to
place relevant items for discussion and action
on the agenda of any or all of the other Councils
and could expect careful consideration with rapid
response including specific recommendations or
appropriate action.
Each and all of the four Administrative Councils had direct
access to the Institution's Administration through the Executive
Council. If problems could be solved at the Council level,
they were then sent to the Executive Council for consideration.
Operationally, the Administrative Councils made their major
policy and programming recommendations directly to the Executive
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Council and could expect a prompt reply and appropriate action.
This action usually took the form of authorizing the Councils
to rapidly carry out their own recommendations. Thus, as they
increasingly assumed virtually total responsibility for the
Institution's operation, the Executive Council became little
more than a polite formality, a rubber stamp used by the four
Administrative Councils.
The purpose of this type of "participant organization"
was to have everybody participate; to open up clear and meaningful
channels of communication between all areas of the Institution—
among Centers and Units, "clinical" and "business" departments,
resident-clients and community clients, the citizens of the
communities and the Administration. Problems were generally
solved at the point of occurrence; basic decisions were being
made by the very people who had to carry them out.
Step Four: Participant Social Action Research
The fourth major organizational strategy used was the
development of an extensive Participant-Social-Action-Research
Program--a research model described in the monograph, Action
Psychology (Pratt & Tooley, 1967b).
The heart of the participant-social-action-research model
is the actualization of human systems through action and research
(Fai rweather, 1967).
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Prerequisite to this approach was a comprehensive computerized
information system which would provide all participants in
the social system accurate and rapid feedback about the
consequences of their actions and decisions. Essentially
such a system is based upon (a) the technological capacity
to electronically process mountains of data rapidly, (b) the
development of the concept of social systems accounting
,
(c) the implementation of Program-Planning-Budgeting-Systems
(PPBS) as leverage for organizational change.
The model that was developed was an integrated set of
information systems and management procedures for continuously
monitoring and optimizing the performance of a mental health
system (including its subsystems) and providing information
to help make decisions about the future course of the organization.
The information systems were designed to:
1. Measure "what is" (i.e. assessing the state of system
programati cal ly)
.
2. Measure the discrepancy between "what is" and "what
could be" (e.g. assessing the gap between program
outcomes and program objectives).
3. Continuously monitor, evaluate and feed back information
to each subsystem on its performance.
The basic input data required fell within three basic classes:
1. Individual Variables (e.g. clinical and demographic
data on individual clients from various levels—
biological, intrapsychic, behavioral, interpersonal
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etc.*, al so individual data on numbers and types
of staff and client transactions).
2. Social System Variables (e.g. treatment, training
and research programs; organizational size, staffing,
and budgets
,
etc. )
.
3. Ecological Variables (e.g. census tract data, social
indicators of given communities, incidence of psycho-
social disorders, etc.).
The development of this system required three years and
over two million dollars. Each of the Centers and units had
a top systems administrator who was responsible and accountable
for the development of all the systems and refinement of all
the procedures within his unit. Thus, "systems development"
was not carried out exclusively by a separate department, but
like training, was integrated into ongoing, everyday programming,
utilizing centralized resources as needed.
In the largest treatment center a concentrated effort was
being made to provide all employees with feedback on their
own behavior and attitudes. Information from dozens of
questionnaires and rating scales was collected and fed back
into the system every month. As a result many long-term
institutionalized employees began to make that critical contingency
link between what they do and say and the subsequent consequences
on the center system as a whole and on the residents within the
center. The began to learn that they could have an effect on
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"the system" and that they could change it to make it a better
system in which to live and work.
The following information systems were developed over the
three year period.
Staff - Cl i ent Transacti on Regi ster (SCTR)
. This system was
a total time reporting procedure for all staff members. A
form composed of a detailed taxonomy of frequent program
transactions including intra and extra organization activities
was completed daily by all staff members. This form was used
to gather data on the frequency and duration of all staff
activities from treatment transactions to housekeeping
operations. In addition this system provided basic information
regarding the frequency and type of all services rendered,
including indirect and direct services to various types of
clients (e.g. out-patients, families, judges, teachers,
employers, county welfare officials, etc.). An important
feature of this system was an accurate accounting of indirect
client services such as consultation with gatekeepers, public
appearances, etc. These data were cumulated by ward, center
and for the total hospital monthly and annually.
Operations and Prog ram Inventory (OPI). This information
system was designed to assess the programmatic state of a complex
mental health system and to serve as an instrument to measure
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(a) the discrepancy between "what is" and "what ought to be"
and (b) programmatic changes over time (i.e. movement toward
specified objectives). The inventory consisted of a taxonomy
of all organizational programs including treatment, training,
research, administrative and business operations. Data reported
included numbers and types of staff members and clients participating
in all organizational programs, including duration of participation.
These data were collected daily by each subsystem within the
overall system, cumulated and reported weekly, monthly and annually.
Resident Transaction Register (RTR). The Resident Transaction
Register provided information about the quantity and quality
of each resident's social transactions. The data collected
included the frequency, type and level of transactions in all
of the social systems in which each resident participated. This
included behavior on the ward, in psychotherapy and activity
groups, participation in resident government, and level of
performance in special training programs. Specifically included
were data concerning the depth and breadth of the resident's
participation in off-campus social systems. These data were
collected daily, updated weekly and reported weekly and monthly
by individual. In addition, the individual data was grouped
and reported by ward and center each month.
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Program Control and Cost Accounting System (PCCASl. This
fiscal data system reported each direct expenditure according
to the program code developed in the Program and Operations
Inventory. These data were collected daily and updated weekly.
Additional data included staff costs by program and indirect
program costs which were reported monthly and annually for
each program, each Center and for the total organization.
This system was essential to the construction of systems
performance budgets .
Ecological Information System (EIS). The information provided
by this system included census tract data for the geographic
catchment area served by the hospital; it also included
descriptive statistics of the incidence of differing psycho-
social disorders and in high incidence areas specific social
indicators. In addition client movement statistics including
admission, discharge and readmission figures were collected.
A special feature of this system was the tracking of clients
through the various mental health systems within the catchment
area.
These five information systems then provided the information
base for an integrated Program-Planning-Budgeting-Evaluation-
System (PPBES) , as well as for a rudimentary computer-based
clinical information system. By combining information from
these basic systems five major reports were generated which
provided detailed information for making both clinical
and
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executive decisions at all levels within the hospital.
In summary this system was a means of better achieving the
stated purposes of the organization. It provided the basic
information and feedback essential to analyze the implicit
cost-benefit consequences of administrative decisions at all
system levels as well as outcomes of clinical decisions.
Secondly, it required that systems at all levels explicitly
state their objectives and assess the degree to which these
objectives are achieved. Third, it provided system performance
information at all levels from the individual client to the
zone level. Fourth, it provided an unusually complete
information base for conducting research on the effectiveness
of specific treatment programs and techniques. Fifth, by
combining ecological data on the incidence of psychosocial
disorders with social indicator data from the area in question,
it suggested points of leverage and possible methods of
community intervention to lower the incidence of disorder.
Finally, it presented to the public and the legislature
an accounting of who was benefited and who was debited by
what programs and what systems and it made public definitive
information on the cost-benefit consequences of the policies
and programs that were developed.
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Outcomes
In this chapter I have sketched out a theoretical model
of human systems actualization" and illustrated its rigorous
application to a state "mental hospital." The contract-system
approach made it possible for the first time to apply a general
systems theory approach to transform an entire organization.
Progress was saltatory, but real.
The major achievements in the three years of this large-
scale experiment in social change included:
1. Reduced the resident population from 2,000 to 1,100.
2. Decentralized into catchment-area Center structure.
3. Developed the Participation Administration structure.
4. Organized a comprehensive interdisciplinary training
ladder for all employees.
5. Initiated a systems actualization and research program.
6. Received three Gerty Awards for outstanding programs.
7. Replaced original custodial programs with over 100
new treatment, training, and research programs.
8. Developed reciprocity networks with major industries,
universities and mental health facilities in the community.
9. Moved staff into key positions on the basis of personal
competence rather than disciplinary membership.
10. Phased out the T.B. ward.
11. Increased the number of clients in community-based
programs from 240 to 1,350.
12. Increased the number of community-based programs
from one to over fifty.
January
1966
January
1970
Population
Increase/Decrease
Inpatients 2,146 1,117 - 52%
Outpatients 352 1,562 + 443%
Community Clients 246
!
1,358 + 530%
Total Clients 2,744 4,037 + 147%
Pre and Post Intervention Data
Figure III
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Toward the end of the experiment in 1970, I wrote:
In addition the endeavor has survived in a social-
political system in which nothing fails like certain
types of success. "Mental hospi tal s"— as well as
prisons and all of society's closed institutions for
"socialization-- are potential powderkegs. This
experiment in social innovation exists only so long
as the encompassing social system chooses to support
it. This social experiment, like most social systems,
exists at the sufferance of a higher level system--
in this case the state and the nation. Granted
the mandate to further this experiment, the goal
will be to develop the finest "mental health"
facility in the world--a true center for Human
Actualization (Tooley, 1970b).
Within two months the prediction, like Bennis' "quick
karate chop" came true. A new, ul tra-conservative governor
dismissed the liberal Director of Mental Health, installed
an interim hatchetman and proceeded to dismantle the Department
and divert its many resources into law and order programs.
Under the circumstances it became impossible to provide any-
thing more than custodial services and those competent
professionals who were not purged with Dr. Visotsky mostly
left the state (Fisher, Mehr & Truckenbrod, 1973).
In spite of the monumental set backs of 1970 isolated areas
of progress are being made around the county, but as mentioned
earlier, most liberal human service professionals are riding
out the Zeitgeist waiting until the broader society has once
again set priority on human development and actualization
(Tooley, in press). Like Bandura, it is still to be hoped
that:
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The day may not be far off when psychological disorders
will be treated not in hospitals or mental hygiene
clinics but in comprehensive learning centers, where
clients will be considered not patients suffering from
hidden psychic pathologies, but responsible people
who participate actively in developing their own
potentialities (Bandura, 1967, p. 86).
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CHAPTER X
FUTURES
Prophesy is extremely difficult--especially about
the future (ancient Chinese proverb).
Given the difficulty of forecasting what might we anticipate
as future areas of application? Generally speaking it would
seem that any situation, person or system in need of stabilization,
security, predictability, or guaranteed outcomes might look to a
4
/
a contractual mechanism to meet these needs. Let us look
at some examples.
The Living Will and the Right to Die :
As noted in an earlier chapter the modern legal concept
of "contract" historically came about in the form of a "will"
to better assure people of property that their wishes would
be carried out after death (Maine, 1861). It is no historical
accident that today's advocates of what is being called the
"right to die" are proposing what they call a "living will."
If enacted, it would in essence constitute a legal contract
stipulating that under certain conditions (such as terminal
disease) that life not be supported by mechanical, pharmacological
or surgical means. Such a resolution has been in 1974 intro-
duced as a bill in the Massachusetts Legislature.
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Alternative Marriage Contracts :
Since first proposed some years ago (Satir, 1967; Tooley, 1966b)
alternative, renegotiate marriage contracts have been
becoming increasingly popular--to the point that the O'Neills'
book. Open Marriage reached the best-seller lists last year.
In spite of organized resistance by the churches, bills are
being introduced to legalize a variety of different types of
contracts with contractual articles covering such contingencies
as: division of property; custody of children; sexual and
economic rights and obligations; domestic and child-rearing
obligations; and length of contract and the processes of
negotiation and arbitration (Rogers, 1972).
In a related area some professionals are beginning to
experiment with a contractual approach to family therapy
and marital counseling. Here the basic process is that of
working out the "family contract" in ways that are reciprocally
satisfying and mutually reinforcing to the family members.
A1 ternati ves to Tenure :
As universities undergo the changes required by a changing
broader society, such institutions as tenure are being
critically reappraised in the light of the needs and economics
of the society. One alternative being studied at the University
of Massachusetts is a "graduated contract plan" culminating
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in tenure under certain conditions (George, 1974). Curiously,
this plan is not dissimilar to the graduated contract plan
proposed for mental patients ten years ago (Praff & Tooley,
1964). Other colleges and universities such as Union College
are experimenting with similar contractual arrangements with
faculty.
Alternatives to Supervision :
Traditional methods of supervision are clearly no longer
sufficient in dealing with human beings in an increasingly
democratizing climate (Toffler, 1970). A handful of organizations
are experimenting with substituting the supervisory process
for a negotiated contract process in which usually a junior
and a more senior member sit down and define in operational and/or
behavioral terms what is expected of each. Specific goals
are set, the time-frame is developed, performance criteria
are identified and a process of contract review is agreed
upon. Essential to this concept is that when performance
is unsatisfactory, the terms of the contract become the primary
focus. This is in sharp contrast with the traditional
practice of reviewing and criticizing the employee's performance
(Tooley, in press)--not unlike Ryan's (1971) concept of blaming
the victim.
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Contract Alternatives to Schools :
The early attempts of performance contracting have opened
the doors to broader application of contract theory in education.
The extensive use of learning contracts at the School of Education
at the University of Massachusetts and the development of a
state-wide contractual college system in New York--Empire
State Col lege--indicates a more extensive exploration of
educational contracting. One possibility recently adduced by
Harvey Schribner (1974) is individualized performance contracting
(as opposed to organizational performance contracting). Basically,
in a system of this type, competent individuals, both traditional
teachers and others, would be identified and certified as to
their competence. Negotiations would then be conducted leading
toward a contract whereby for a determined amount of money (or
other reinforcer) a given "teacher" would agree to bring a
determined number of students up to agreed upon levels of
proficiency in specified educational or vocational areas.
Contractually Negotiated Ethics :
Hi stori cal ly , Western Civilization has lived with (and by)
value systems and standards of ethics based upon Uudeo-
Christian dogma--set, irreversible doctrines which clearly
defined what was morally right and what was sinful. In
response the position of "situational ethics" emerged in
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recent years in an attempt to put in perspective the situational
determinants of moral behavior; this axiological stance, however,
can be justly criticized as being as guilty of ex post facto
"cultural relativism" as moral dogma has been of rigid
"cultural absolutism." A possible alternative is the negotiation
between individuals, groups and organizations those behaviors
that are prescribed as "moral" and those proscribed as "immoral"
or wrong. This, in one instance, is the moral basis of the
new alternative marital contracts just described (Nielson, 1974).
Ethics and morality, then, become behaviors to be negotiated
and exchanged; values to be made explicit and promises to be
made—with contingencies defined--all within the overriding
and binding context of a negotiated contract (Johnson, Dokecki &
Mowrer, 1972; Osborn, 1974; Tooley, 1974).
Back full circle to our original postulate that organized
social life and civilization are dependent upon reliable,
predictable behavior and the keeping of promises--or contracts.
We return to Hayakawa's statement:
What we call society is a vast network of mutual
agreements. We agree to refrain from murdering
our fellow citizens, and they in turn agree to refrain
from murdering us; we agree to drive on the right-
hand side of the road, and others agree to do the same;
we agree to deliver specified goods, and others
agree to pay us for them; we agree to observe the
rules of an organization, and the organization agrees
to let us enjoy its privileges. This complicated
network of agreements, into which almost every detail
of our lives is woven and upon which most of our
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expectations in life are based, consists essentially
of statements about future events which we are supposed
,
with oujr own efforts
,
to bring about
. Without such
agreements, there would be no such thing as society.
We would all be huddling in miserable and lonely
caves, not daring to trust anyone. With such agree-
ments, and a will on the part of the vast majority
of people to live by them, behavior begins to fall
into relatively predictable patterns; cooperation
becomes possible; peace and freedom are established
(Hayakawa, 1967, p. 213).
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